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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court first articulated a right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel in criminal cases more than fifty years
ago.' Until recently, no uniform standard specifically set out the
substance of this constitutional right. To the contrary, the sub-
stantive degree of protection afforded the right depended upon its
definition by the jurisdiction applying it. Therefore, a criminal de-
fendant's rights in this regard depended upon broad, unpredictable
judicial discretion.
For example, until recently a defendant tried in a state court in
Utah could allege a violation of his right to effective assistance only
if his representation by counsel was so lacking that it constituted a
farce or "mockery of justice."' 2 If the same defendant was tried in
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. B.S., University
of Nebraska, 1972; J.D., University of Nebraska College of Law, 1976; LL.M, Temple
University School of Law, 1982.
In this article, all masculine pronouns should be read as including the feminine gender.
1. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-73 (1932). Though the sixth amendment pro-
vides that a criminal defendant "shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Coun-
sel for his defense," the term "effective" does not appear. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. State v. Pierren, 583 P.2d 69 (Utah 1978).
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a Wisconsin state court, however, he was guaranteed representa-
tion of the type and quality rendered by a reasonably competent
attorney.3 The qualitative differences between these and other stan-
dards were dramatic. Their definitions and applications were
products of arbitrary decisions by trial and appellate courts.
The purpose of this article is two-fold. First, the rather chaotic
state of the law in this area will be discussed. Second, a potential
remedy to the problem will be suggested. The underlying thesis of
this article is that the only solution to the problems presented is the
creation and adoption of a uniform statutory scheme which sets
out, with specificity, the right to effective assistance of counsel to
be afforded defendants in criminal cases. A legislative approach to
the solution of this problem will relieve courts of the need to devise
and apply standards on a case-by-case basis.
From the outset, it should be obvious that only the defense attor-
ney can insure effective representation. The burden of guiding a
defendant through the complex maze of the criminal justice system
rests on his shoulders. However, the path to be taken must be illu-
minated by the guideposts of a uniform standard of competence.
Without such a standard, counsel is left to speculate about the spe-
cific nature of his professional responsibilities. His client's protec-
tion is left to the nearly unchecked discretion of the judiciary. In a
society that prides itself on the protection of individual rights,
neither of these present-day realities should be tolerated.
THE UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE: A BRIEF HISTORY
The concept of a right to effective assistance of counsel is not a
recent development in American jurisprudence. It has been with
us for at least a century.4 However, the idea that the right is of
constitutional dimensions is of relatively recent origin.
The Supreme Court first articulated a constitutional right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel in Powell v. Alabama 5-the famous
"Scottsboro Boys" case. The Court granted certiorari to review
the death sentences received by the seven defendants, young black
men who had been convicted of raping two young, white women.6
Though three assignments of error were proffered, the Court con-
sidered only one:
3. State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 802, 285 N.W.2d 905, 907 (1979).
4. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 9 Mo. App. 321 (1880), afl'd, 74 Mo. 222 (1881).
5. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
6. Id. at 50.
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[T]he defendants, and each of them, were denied due process of
law and the equal protection of the laws, in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment, specifically as follows: .. .they were
denied the right of counsel, with the accustomed incidents of
consultation and opportunity of preparation for trial.7
After a discussion of the representation given petitioners, the Court
held that the petitioners had been denied "the right of counsel in
any substantial sense." 8 The Court further held that, in a capital
case, courts must assign counsel to those who are unable to ade-
quately prepare their defense and that this "duty is not discharged
by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to
preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of
the case."9 However, the Court did not specifically define "effective
aid."
The Court did, however, refer to the indicia of effective represen-
tation. At various points in the opinion, such terms as "effective
and substantial aid," 10 "aid of counsel in any real sense,"" exercis-
ing "their best judgment,"' 2 "prompt and thoroughgoing investiga-
tion"' 3 and "zealous and active"" appear. Though such terms
avail themselves of a spectrum of definitions, courts have employed
them as guideposts in applying the newly developed constitutional
principles.
Less than ten years after its decision in Powell, the Court again
considered the issue of what constitutes effective assistance in Av-
ery v. Alabama.I5 The petitioner had been convicted of murder and
sentenced to death. The sole issue presented was whether he had
been denied his "right to counsel, with the accustomed incidents of
consultation and opportunity of preparation for trial."' 6 The al-
leged denial was founded on the trial court's refusal to grant a re-
quested continuance.1 7
The Court, ultimately affirming the state court's judgment, 8
7. Id.
8. Id. at 58.
9. Id. at 71. It must be noted that the Court's use of the term "effective aid" appears
to be dicta. However, this term gave direction to the more comprehensive development
of the concept of "effective assistance."
10. Id. at 53, 71.
11. Id. at 57.
12. Id. at 58.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
16. Id. at 445.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 453.
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again addressed the scope of the right to effective assistance of
counsel. In assigning a "peculiar sacredness" to this right, the
Court observed that:
[T]he denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to confer, to
consult with the accused and to prepare his defense, could con-
vert the appointment of counsel into a sham and nothing more
than a formal compliance with the Constitution's requirement
that an accused be given the assistance of counsel. The Constitu-
tion's guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by
mere formal appointment.19
The Court concluded that petitioner had been afforded the assis-
tance of "zealous and earnest counsel" since counsel had "con-
tested every step of the way leading to final disposition of the
case."
20
It is questionable whether the Avery decision added much to the
bar's understanding of the right. The Court's dictum suggested, in
broad terms, what effective assistance is not; however, it added lit-
tle to an understanding of what it is.
During the years following the Avery decision the Supreme
Court decided a number of cases that raised this issue. The Court
in Glasser v. United States specifically extended the right to defen-
dants in federal court.21 Other cases dealt with various forms of
alleged ineffectiveness.22 Overall, the Court continued to employ,
on a case-by-case basis, the same language and concepts articulated
in Powell and Avery. No uniform definition emerged that could be
generally applied with any degree of logical consistency. Even the
Court's landmark decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,23 establishing
the right of indigents to appointed counsel, failed to define the na-
ture and quality of the assistance guaranteed.
In 1970 the Court, in McMann v. Richardson,24 finally devised a
definition of "effective assistance." In McMann, which concerned
the validity of the respondents' guilty pleas, the Court directly ad-
dressed the issue of effective assistance. It stated that resolution of
19. Id. at 446.
20. Id. at 450.
21. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
22. Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955) (alleged ineffectiveness based upon de-
fense attorney's failure to file a timely motion to quash the indictment); Reece v. Georgia,
350 U.S. 85 (1955) (appointed counsel had insufficient time to prepare defense); White v.
Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945) (failure of counsel to confer with his client and call a particu-
lar witness at trial).
23. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, the Court extended the sixth amendment guar-
antee to state prosecutions.
24. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
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the issue rests "not on whether a court would retrospectively con-
sider counsel's advice to be right or wrong, but whether that advice
was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in crimi-
nal cases."25 It is questionable, however, whether the Court in-
tended to establish this "test" as a uniform minimum
constitutional standard. In fact, the Court concluded that the mat-
ter of "proper standards of performance" should be "left to the
good sense and discretion of the trial courts. '26
Since its opinion in McMann, the Court on at least two occa-
sions has used the "range of competence" standard as the yardstick
for measurement of effective assistance.2 7 Until recently, this was
the extent of guidance given by the Court in defining an applicable
standard.
STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARD
The Court's reticence in defining a constitutional standard ended
in 1984 when it decided Strickland v. Washington.2s The Strick-
land Court made it clear that the standard it defined is applicable
to every stage of a criminal adjudication.29
The respondent pleaded guilty to three counts of capital murder
in a Florida state court, and a sentencing hearing was set. While
preparing for the hearing, respondent's counsel did not seek out
character witnesses, request a psychiatric examination of the re-
spondent, or request a presentence report.3 ° Counsel's decision to
forego these actions was based upon tactical considerations; coun-
sel hoped, by not presenting evidence that would have been uncov-
ered by these actions, to keep certain aggravating facts from the
sentencing judge. After the hearing, respondent Washington was
sentenced to death on each of the three counts of murder.3' In his
appeal, Washington did not raise the issue of ineffective assist-
ance.3 2 The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the convictions and
25. Id. at 771 (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,
266 (1973).
28. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
29. Id. at 2064.
30. Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285, 286 (Fla. 1981).
31. Id.
32. Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658, 664-65 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
937 (1979). The issues raised were alleged misapplication of the statutory sentencing
provisions and alleged violations of constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual
punishment.
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sentences. 3
Washington next sought relief through a state statutory postcon-
viction relief action by which he alleged ineffective assistance by
both trial and appellate counsel.34 After a hearing, the trial court
denied relief.35 Washington appealed to the Supreme Court of
Florida,36 alleging that the trial court misapplied the standard for
effective assistance of counsel without giving Washington a full evi-
dentiary hearing on the matter.37 The appeal did not, however,
challenge the constitutionality of the standard applied.38 The court
denied relief, as well as Washington's motion for a stay of execu-
tion. It also precluded any rehearing on the petition. 39 At this
point Washington exhausted his state remedies.
Washington next sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court,
alleging as a basis for relief trial counsel's failure to investigate de-
fendant's background for potentially mitigating evidence.' The
district court found that while Washington's attorney may have
made judgmental errors, the errors were not prejudicial because
they did not affect the outcome of the sentencing hearing. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed,42 stating
that an attorney is not required to pursue a line of investigation
"when a strategic choice of counsel" makes it unnecessary. 3 The
court further held that a defendant, to prevail on a claim of ineffec-
tive assistance, must "demonstrate [not only] that the ineffective
assistance created ... a 'possibility of prejudice,' but [also] that [it]
33. Id. at 667.
34. Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1981). Since appellate counsel's repre-
sentation "did not relate to the judgment and sentence of the trial court," this issue was
not considered during the postconviction proceeding. Id. at 287.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 286.
38. Id. at 286-87. The four-pronged standard was first articulated by the Supreme
Court of Florida in Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997 (1981): First, the omission or overt
act upon which the ineffective assistance claim is based must be detailed in the appropri-
ate pleading. Second, the defendant has the burden of showing that the omission or overt
act complained of was a "substantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of
competent counsel." Id. at 1001. Third, the defendant also has the burden of showing
that counsel's deficiency was so substantial that it is likely that the deficient conduct
affected the outcome of the court proceedings. Fourth, even if the defendant makes the
above showing, the state can still rebut it by establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that
in fact there was no prejudice. Id. at 1000-01 (citing United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d
196 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc).
39. Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285, 287 (Fla. 1981).
40. Washington sought relief under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
41. See Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 890 (5th Cir. 1982).
42. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1982).
43. Id. at 1251.
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worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage."'  The court of
appeals remanded the case for district court determination of
whether Washington's right to effective assistance of counsel was
violated and whether such violation, if any, actually and substan-
tially disadvantaged his defense.45 The State of Florida success-
fully petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court.
4 6
I. The Two-Pronged "Standard"
In reversing the Eleventh Circuit decision, the Supreme Court
defined the constitutional standard for effective assistance of coun-
sel.47 The standard has two components. First, a defendant must
establish that specific attorney conduct was deficient as measured
by a standard of "reasonableness" relative to "prevailing profes-
sional norms."4 8 Once such deficient conduct is established, the
defendant must then demonstrate that there is a "reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. ' 49 The Court limited
application of this standard to cases of alleged "actual ineffective
assistance of counsel";5" the standard does not apply where ineffec-
tiveness is presumed.5 ' The Court suggested that the new standard
applies to all criminal proceedings, not just the trial and sentencing
stages of adjudication. 2
It will become clear that this "standard" fails to resolve the
problems that have plagued courts for decades. An analysis of the
Court's holding will demonstrate that what has been presented as a
standard is largely a concept without workable substance.
44. Id. at 1258.
45. Id. at 1263-64.
46. Strickland v. Washington, 462 U.S. 1105 (1983).
47. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 3562
(1984).
48. Id. at 2065.
49. Id. at 2068.
50. Id. at 2063.
51. Id. at 2067. An example of "presumed" ineffectiveness is the existence of a con-
flict of interest. For a conflict to be used as a ground for ineffective assistance it must be
established that an actual (versus potential) conflict existed. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia,
450 U.S. 261, 268-74 (1981); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-50 (1980). Other
examples of "presumed" ineffectiveness are cited in United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct.
2039, 2047 n.24 (1984).
52. Id. at 2064.
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II. The "Standard" Without Substance. Attorney Performance
The Court describes its decision as setting a "standard" by
which claims of ineffective assistance may be resolved.13 Yet "stan-
dard" is commonly understood to mean "a definite level of excel-
lence" or "attainment."'54 The Court declines to define specific
criteria in its standard. All the Court tells us is that it is an objec-
tive standard for which the "proper measure ... remains simply
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms."55 Several
questions arise from this definition. What are these "norms"?56
Are they uniform? Are they defined by the trial judge? If the pro-
fessional norms of a given locale are extremely low, are they still
the yardstick to be used to determine whether an attorney's per-
formance falls below the constitutional standard? Is there a mini-
mum constitutional threshold of performance? If so, what is it?
These and other issues are left unresolved by Strickland.
Though the Court declined to resolve these issues, it did address
them. It found that "specific guidelines" or "detailed rules" are
not appropriate and, in fact, would hinder an attorney's ability to
make tactical decisions.5 7 How guidelines would have such an ef-
fect is not explained by the Court. Support for this proposition is
not proffered. From the standpoint of a trial attorney seeking firm
guidance in this area, the proposition seems highly questionable. 8
The lack of articulable criteria is not the only deficiency in the
performance standard. The Court has directed appellate courts to
be "highly deferential" to trial court findings on this issue when
applying the new standard. 9 It has, in fact, coupled the perfor-
mance standard with a "strong presumption" that the attorney
rendered adequate assistance.6' A defendant faced with this pre-
53. Id. at 2070.
54. 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3016 (compact ed. 1971).
55. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.
56. Normative behavior is that which falls within the parameters of a defined pattern.
Without a definition of a pattern of professional conduct it is impossible to determine
when an attorney's conduct violates the "norms." This is especially true of an attorney's
conduct in his role as an advocate. See generally Heinz & Laumann, The Legal Profes-
sion: Client Interests, Professional Roles and Social Hierarchies, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1111
(1978); Rueschemeyer, Doctors and Lawyers: A Comment on the Theory of the Profes-
sions, 1 CAN. REV. Soc. & ANTHROPOLOGY 17 (1964).
57. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.
58. Specific guidelines might, in fact, have the opposite effect. They would specify the
"rules of the game" so as to give notice of permissible, as well as expected, behavior. At
present, counsel must speculate about what he may, as well as what he must, do. The
proposed Guidelines will directly address these concerns. See infra appendix at § II.
59. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.
60. Id. at 2066.
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sumption may be forced to prove that the attorney's performance
was so egregiously ineffective that the proceeding was a "farce. "61
Any performance above this level may be deemed constitutionally
adequate. The history of the law in this area reveals that very few
legitimately aggrieved defendants will prevail.62
Ill The Prejudice Factor
Before Strickland, many courts applied the outcome-determina-
tive test in ineffective assistance cases.63 Defendants had to prove
that counsel's representation was so deficient that it more likely
than not altered the outcome of the case.' In Strickland, the
Court declined to adopt this test.65 Instead, it adopted what might
be described as the "reasonable probability" test.66 That is, "[the]
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different."' 67  Though the Court suggested that
this test imposes on the defendant a lesser burden of proof than
that imposed by the outcome-determinative test,68 other aspects of
the Court's decision suggest that the defendant's burden will not be
lightened.
For example, the Court stated that the "ultimate focus of in-
quiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding, "69
61. See, e.g., Ellis v. Oklahoma, 430 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1010 (1971).
62. See generally Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1,
20-33 (1973); Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures
from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REV. 927, 927-39 (1973); Finer, Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1077-81 (1973); Comment, Ineffective Representa-
tion as a Basis for Relieffrom Conviction: Principles for Appellate Review, 13 COLUM. J.
L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 25-37 (1977).
63. See Note, A New Focus on Prejudice in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cases:
The Assertion of the Rights Standard, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 32-40 (1983).
64. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (noting that the "harmless error"
rule had been adopted by all of the states, the Court required the defendant to show that
the error affected the outcome of the case); United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 215
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (defendant must demonstrate that ineffective assistance affected the
outcome).
65. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.
66. Id.
67. Id. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome." Id. This "but for" test, which has a long history in tort law, refers to
the causal connection between an act and its consequences. See W. KEETON, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS 266-69 (5th ed. 1984). This concept of proximate cause is often
applied in legal malpractice actions. See, e.g., Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 520, 80
S.E.2d 144, 146 (1954).
68. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.
69. Id.
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and that the scope of this inquiry is the "totality of evidence."7
Viewing these two requirements together, it is reasonable to as-
sume that counsel could commit one or more outrageous errors
but, depending on the amount of damaging evidence presented by
the prosecution, could still be found to have provided adequate
assistance. It is difficult to imagine how this inquiry will protect
defendants' constitutional rights. To the contrary, the standard
may have the effect of lowering standards of practice and threaten-
ing the integrity of the adjudication process.
Another facet of Strickland that causes concern is the Court's
directive that appellate courts apply a rebuttable presumption
against a finding of prejudice.7" Due to social and economic cir-
cumstances, most defendants lack resources to acquire the highly
skilled assistance required to bring a successful case to court. De-
fendants who had ineffective assistance at trial are singularly unfit
to bear the burden of overcoming this presumption.7 2 Though the
presumption may reduce the number of actions filed, it may not
remedy the wrongs done to victims of ineffective assistance of
counsel.7 3 As Justice Marshall wisely suggested in his dissent, once
a defendant establishes that counsel violated the performance stan-
dard, a new trial should be granted "regardless of whether the de-
fendant suffered demonstrable prejudice."74
Taken as a whole, the Court's two-pronged test is inappropriate
and unworkable. This is especially true of the performance compo-
nent. It is a standard without definition; thus it is no standard at
all. To give it meaning, the Court or legislatures must follow the
lead of the lower courts and adopt specific guidelines for resolution
of ineffective assistance of counsel actions.75
FUNCTIONS OF A SPECIFIC STANDARD
The Court in Strickland made it abundantly clear that a detailed
set of objective standards is inappropriate.7 6  The Court is not
alone in this belief.77 Some commentators have suggested that spe-
cific performance standards in fact hinder an attorney in providing
70. Id.
71. See id. at 2068.
72. Id. at 2076-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 2078.
74. Id. at 2077.
75. See id. at 2076 (lists lower courts that adopted specific guidelines).
76. Id. at 2065.
77. See generally Note, A Functional Analysis of Effective Assistance of Counsel, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1053, 1074 (1980).
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adequate representation. One argument is that such standards will
restrict an attorney's ability to make tactical judgments and exer-
cise discretion in preparing and litigating a criminal case.78 Other
commentators have suggested that defining effective specific stan-
dards is impossible, since no set of standards can cover the myriad
of factual and tactical concerns presented in cases. 79 At first blush,
these arguments appear to have some merit. This apparent merit
is, however, called into question when one considers the arguments
in light of the realities of the practice of criminal law.
The principal problem with these arguments rests with their pro-
ponents' inability to create a set of standards adaptable to the va-
garies of criminal proceedings. These commentators, who seem to
assume that specific standards would require an attorney either to
take some action that would not otherwise be taken or to decline to
do something required by the facts of the case, possess a fatally
limited idea of what a performance standard might entail.
An appropriate performance standard would simply set out, in
concise and unambiguous terms, the general criteria for "reasona-
bleness" relative to "prevailing professional norms." It would de-
fine these in a uniform manner to avoid the variances that now
exist among jurisdictions. It would not require lock-step adher-
ence without regard to the facts of a particular case. Thus, an at-
torney would retain the ability to make tactical decisions.
Such a uniform standard would serve three basic functions.
First, it would provide criminal defense attorneys with a general
standard of performance that meets the Supreme Court's test of
reasonable competence. This is particularly necessary for inexperi-
enced attorneys, for whom a standard would provide a "roadmap"
to effective representation. Additionally, meeting the requirements
of such a standard might provide attorneys with a defense to a
disgruntled client's malpractice action. 0
Second, a uniform standard would provide trial and appellate
courts with an articulable guide for resolving postconviction ac-
78. See Tague, The Attempt to Improve Criminal Defense Representation, 15 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 109, 123, 127 (1977).
79. See United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (due to the
"infinite variety of decisions in the development and prosecution of the case... categori-
cal rules are not appropriate"); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977)
(Duniway, J., concurring) (generalized standards may be little more than a "semantic
merry-go-round"), vacated, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 974 (1979).
80. See Kaus & Mallen, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel-Reflections on "Criminal
Malpractice", 21 UCLA L. REV. 1191, 1201 (1974).
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tions based on allegations of ineffective assistance. 8' At present,
judges face the same problem faced by defense attorneys: what are
the constitutional requirements for effective assistance? Aside from
cases where ineffectiveness is presumed, judges are now required to
devise their own definitions of effective assistance, as they were
before Strickland.82 The Court's adoption of "reasonableness" as a
standard of performance has done nothing to remedy this
situation.
Finally, a uniform standard will, ultimately, function as a guar-
antee of the right to effective assistance of counsel. Defendants will
have a clear understanding of the quality of representation to
which they are entitled. Though the Strickland Court believed
that "guidelines ... would encourage the proliferation of ineffec-
tiveness challenges, "83 no significant data supports this conclu-
sion."' There appears to be no evidence that people, when they
become aware of the existence of a legal remedy, abuse the legal
system by filing frivolous claims. In fact, the opposite result might
occur."5 In any event, failure to adequately inform defendants of
81. See Comment, supra note 62, at 1-90.
82. For cases where ineffectiveness is presumed, see Flanagan v. United States, 104 S.
Ct. 1051 (1984) (denial of right to counsel); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978)
(conflict of interest); Estelle v. Smith, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (introduction of statements
obtained in violation of fifth amendment rights); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968) (denial of right to confront witnesses). See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
See generally Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Lingering Debate, 65 COR-
NELL L. REV. 659, 661 (1980); Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Sixth
Amendment and the Fair Trial Guarantee, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1380, 1386-87, 1399-1401,
1408-10 (1983).
83. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.
84. A number of courts have adopted guidelines as a standard for professional per-
formance norms. See Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2076, for a list of these courts. To date,
there does not appear to be any evidence that the number of ineffectiveness claims has
increased in such jurisdictions. See generally Levine, Preventing Defense Counsel Error-
An Analysis of Some Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims and Their Implications for
Professional Regulation, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 1275, 1370-80 (1984); Comment, supra note
62, at 1-17.
The number of federal cases filed by state prisoners has, overall, dramatically increased
in the last forty years. However, the number of filings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the fed-
eral habeas corpus statute, has not significantly increased in the last fifteen years. See D.
WILKES, JR., FEDERAL AND STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF 17-25
(1983) (1984 Supp.).
85. It has been suggested that many claims are filed because defendants are incapable
of distinguishing between facts that support such claims and those that clearly do not.
See United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608, 614 (2d Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964). Assuming that this is true, mandatory guidelines could have
the effect of reducing the number of meritless claims filed as a result of ignorance of the
law. It is conceded that guidelines would probably not reduce the filing of claims known
by defendants to be patently frivolous. See, e.g., Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669-70
(D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
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their legal rights, in hopes of discouraging them from exercising
such rights, runs counter to our society's concept of justice.
TOWARD A UNIFORM STANDARD: A MODEST PROPOSAL
Through the years, courts have wrestled with the problem of de-
fining standards for effective assistance of counsel.16 Few ever ac-
complished the goal. Some courts took refuge in simple labels such
as "farce,"87  "mockery of justice" 8 and "reasonable compe-
tence. '8 9 Yet the "tests" suffered from the same deficiency: each
lacked uniform, articulable standards of what constitutes effective
assistance of counsel.90 Consequently, courts were forced to apply
ad hoc standards on a case-by-case basis. At best, judges defined
standards according to their personal concepts of effective repre-
sentation.9' At worst, they were guided by intuition.92 Thus a di-
versity of "tests" developed through the years, with each test based
on largely subjective judgments.9 3 In response to this diversity, a
number of courts created checklists which provided objective crite-
ria.94 However, this failed to lead to the development and adoption
of a uniform standard on either the federal or state level.
The problems inherent in a lack of uniform standards did not go
unnoticed by the legal profession. After years of research and dis-
cussion, the American Bar Association approved the Standards for
the Administration of Criminal Justice (the "Criminal Justice Stan-
86. See, e.g., Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1983); Beavers v.
Balkom, 636 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1981); Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1981).
87. Frand v. United States, 301 F.2d 102, 103 (10th Cir. 1962).
88. United States v. Tribote, 297 F.2d 598, 601 (2d Cir. 1961).
89. United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 665-66 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
844 (1976).
90. See Tague, supra note 78, at 109; Comment, supra note 62, at 25-48.
91. See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1329-30 (9th Cir.) (en banc)
("whether counsel's acts or omissions were within the range of competence required of
criminal attorneys... involves a measure of personal judgment [by the judge reviewing
the case]"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1978); Matthews v. United States, 449 F.2d 985
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
92. See Tague, supra note 78, at 126 n.99.
93. See, e.g., Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEO. L.J. 811,
820 (1976) ("[W]ords like 'customary' or 'reasonable,' . . . are themselves empty vessels
into which content must be poured. Such standards beg the question of what is custom-
ary or reasonable for a lawyer to do prior to or at arraignment, plea bargaining, trial, or
sentencing.").
94. For analysis of the "enumeration approach" see Erickson, Standards of Compe-
tency for Defense Counsel in a Criminal Case, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233, 251-52 (1979);
Genego, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Performance Standards and Com-
petent Representation, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 181, 203-11 (1984); Tague, supra note 78,
at 127-48; Comment, supra note 62, at 48-53.
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dards") in 1973. 91 The Criminal Justice Standards were designed
as procedural guidelines 96 and were never intended to set standards
for the practice of criminal law. 97 They are simply a set of rules
that reflected a near-consensus of what the law should be. 98
Of specific relevance to the issue of effective assistance are the
Standards Relating to the Defense Function (the "Defense Function
Standards").99 The Defense Function Standards consist of specific
procedural guidelines for representation, °° as well as a discussion
of ethical considerations involved.101 Though the drafters never in-
tended that these standards be used as a test for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, °2 the standards are of value in defining practical
uniform guidelines.
In apparent disregard of the drafters' intent, courts have used
the Defense Function Standards in resolving ineffectiveness claims.
Some courts have adopted several specific standards as governing
law, 103 while others have used the standards as general guidelines
without adopting them." The standards have been useful to some
95. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS]. See Jameson, The Beginning: Background and Devel-
opment of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255, 258-60
(1974). The standards consist of twenty-one chapters, each of which relates to a specific
stage in a criminal proceeding (e.g., trial by jury) or a function of particular participants
in the criminal justice system (e.g., the defense function). A number of the standards will
be discussed in this article.
96. Jameson, supra note 95, at 255.
97. See Erickson, supra note 94, at 243; see also Address by Leon Jaworski, ABA
President, Proceedings at the National Judicial Conference on Standards for the Admin-
istration of Criminal Justice (Feb. 10-14, 1972) (Baton Rouge, La.) (reprinted in 57
F.R.D. 229, 266 (1973)).
98. See Day, Appellate Court Use of the American Bar Association Standards for
Criminal Justice, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 415, 420 (1975).
99. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DE-
FENSE FUNCTION (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS].
100. See, e.g., DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 99, at §§ 4-3.6, 4-3.8, 4-
4.1.
101. Id. at §§ 4-3.5, 4-3.9.
102. [These] standard[s are] intended as a guide for honorable professional con-
duct and performance, not ... as criteria for the judicial evaluation of alleged
misconduct of counsel to determine the validity of a conviction. They may or
may not be relevant in such judicial evaluation, depending upon all the
circumstances.
Id. at § 4-1.1(0.
103. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("they are
certainly relevant guideposts"); State v. Perez, 98 Idaho 181, 183, 579 P.2d 127, 129
(1978) (§ 4-4.1); State v. Thomas, 305 Minn. 513, 516, 232 N.W.2d 766, 768 (1975) (§§ 4-
7.8, 4-7.9); Baxter v. Ross, 523 S.W.2d 930, 932-38 (Tenn. 1975) (used standards as
guidelines).
104. Brescia v. New Jersey, 417 U.S. 921, 924 n.3 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
United States v. Wycoff, 545 F.2d 679, 682-83 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1105
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courts in their attempts to give substance to their previously
adopted "tests."'' 5 However, still other courts have rejected the
standards out of hand, 10 6 suggesting that they are irrelevant in de-
termining the issue of counsel's effectiveness. 10 7
I am not suggesting that the Defense Function Standards should
be adopted in toto as criteria for judging the effectiveness of repre-
sentation. There are at least three reasons for this. First, the stan-
dards were never intended for this use108 but, rather, were drafted
to articulate the professional conduct expected of criminal defense
attorneys.109 Consequently, their focus is as much on ethical con-
siderations as on performance standards. I I
This fact leads to the next reason: the Defense Function Stan-
dards encompass considerations that are almost wholly ethical in
nature with little or no relevance to effective representation. For
example, the specific standards dealing with referral services,"'
prohibited referrals"I2 and fees, I13 while laudable, have little signifi-
cance as criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of represen-
tation.1 4
(1977); Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407, 413 n.6 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868
(1976); Wolfs v. Britton, 509 F.2d 304, 310 (8th Cir. 1975); Moore v. United States, 432
F.2d 730, 741 (3d Cir. 1970) (Van Dusen, J., concurring); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
105. Kimbrough v. State, 352 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. App. 1977) (referred to § 4-4.1;
"reasonable effectiveness" test); Rodgers v. State, 580 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. 1978) (re-
ferred to § 4-6. 1(b); "fair trial" test); State v. Bartlett, 199 Neb. 471, 474-75, 259 N.W.2d
917, 920 (1977) (referred to § 4-3.6; "ordinary training and skill" test).
106. United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671, 677 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1049 (1976); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 437 n.14 (D.C. App.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976).
107. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753 n.6 (1983) (specifically rejecting Defense
Function Standards as establishing constitutional requirements for effective assistance);
People v. Craig, 47 Ill. App. 3d 242, 249, 361 N.E.2d 736, 742 (1977) (stating that the
Defense Function Standards have been rejected by a "majority of the federal circuits");
Schoonover v. State, 218 Kan. 377, 385, 543 P.2d 881, 887, cert. denied, 424 U.S. 944
(1975); Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 99 n.15, 315 N.E.2d 878, 884 n.15
(1974).
108. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
109. See DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 99, at § 4-1.1(0.
110. A "Table of Parallel Provisions in Standards Relating to the Prosecution Func-
tion and the Defense Function and the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility" was
provided in an early draft of the Defense Function Standards. See ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION 19-21 (Approved Draft 1971).
111. See DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 99, at § 4-2.2.
112. Id. at § 4-2.3.
113. Id. at § 4-3.3.
114. For example, the DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 99, at § 4-3.3(a),
address the issue of determination of an appropriate fee. Various criteria are suggested.
The ethical considerations and disciplinary rules found in Canon 2 of the Model Code of
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Finally, the Defense Function Standards suffer from the same de-
ficiency as the common-law "tests": they do not provide a uniform
scheme. This is especially troubling because, since Strickland, at-
torney conduct must meet the constitutional standard articulated
in that case."' Uniform criteria must be designed so that courts
may apply the Strickland test in an objective, consistent manner. 116
The statutory scheme found in the appendix to this article (the
"Guidelines") 1 7 is an attempt to fulfill this directive.
The Guidelines attempt to give workable definition to the Strick-
land standard. Their content is primarily derived from the Crimi-
nal Justice Standards and court decisions. They are presented in a
statutory format amenable to easy legislative adoption. While the
Guidelines may not be the ultimate solution to the problem of inef-
fective assistance, they may be useful as a framework for giving
substance to an ambiguous standard.
Professional Responsibility provide counsel with significantly more guidance in this area.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL CODE]. The same can be said for Rule 1.5 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as MODEL RULES].
The ABA adopted the Model Code in 1969. Since then, virtually every state has
adopted some version of the Model Code. The Model Code consists of the basic Canons;
the Disciplinary Rules (DR's), which establish a level of conduct beneath which an attor-
ney cannot fall without being subject to discipline; and the Ethical Considerations (EC's),
which are goals toward which an attorney should aspire.
The Model Rules were adopted by the ABA in 1983, to replace the Code. At this time,
several states have adopted the Model Rules in whole or in part, and most states are
considering the Model Rules. Unlike the Code, the Model Rules are presented in a re-
statement format.
115. See Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-70.
116. One judge wisely observed that:
[given] the complexities of each case and the constant call for professional dis-
cretion, it would be a misguided endeavor to engrave in stone any rules for
attorney performance. Nonetheless, preserving flexibility is not incompatible
with establishing minimum components of effective assistance ....
United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Bazelon, J., dissent-
ing). This idea is not a novel one. Well before the birth of our Constitution, Montesquieu
expressed this ideal very succinctly:
Those who have a genius sufficient to enable them to give laws to their own...
ought to be particularly attentive to the manner of forming them. Thy style
ought to be concise. Thy style should also be plain and simple, a direct expres-
sion being always better understood than an indirect one.
The laws ought not be subtle; they are designated for people of common under-
standing, not as an art of logic.
C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 376 (Calif. Press 1977).
117. See infra appendix.
19861 Effective Assistance of Counsel
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDELINES
I Preamble 118
A preamble, or "policy section," is a useful device for explaining
the purpose of a legislative scheme." 19 A preamble achieves two
valuable and interrelated goals. First, it explains the legislation's
rationale and intended goals. 12 ° Second, it can be used by courts as
a tool for interpretation and application of the statute to particular
disputes.' 2 ' Although a preamble is seldom conclusive on these is-
sues, 122 courts tend to give it great weight. 123
I Substantive Guidelines
A. Subsection II(1):124 Establishment of the
Attorney-Client Relationship
In a criminal case, counsel's first duty is to contact his client,
advise him of his legal rights and begin the process of investigation.
This section of the Guidelines addresses these duties.
Subsection II(1)(a) of the Guidelines incorporates many of the
substantive duties found in the Defense Function Standards.25
118. See infra appendix at § I.
119. See Globe Fur Dyeing Corp. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 177 (D.D.C. 1978),
affd, 612 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Hayen v. County of Ogle, 116 Ill. App. 3d 80, 84,
451 N.E.2d 612, 615 (1983) ("preamble" and "policy section" are often synonymous),
affd, 101 Ill. 2d 413, 463 N.E.2d 124 (1984); IA N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 20.03 (4th ed. 1985).
120. Price v. Forrest, 173 U.S. 410, 427 (1899) ("a preamble has been said to be a key
to open the understanding of a statute .... We mean only to hold that the preamble may
be referred to in order to assist in ascertaining the intent and meaning of a statute.").
121. See, e.g., Coosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U.S. 550, 563 (1892). If
there is no ambiguity, a preamble may not be used to enlarge or control the scope or
language of the statute. See, e.g., Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Thomas, 132 U.S. 174,
188 (1889); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Marsh, 721 F.2d 767, 773-74 (11th Cir. 1983). As
Justice Holmes observed, "there is no canon against using common sense in construing
laws as saying what they obviously mean." Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339 (1929).
122. See, e.g., McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046 (D.N.H. 1981), rev'd,
668 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1982). However, absent expressed legislative intent to the con-
trary, legal terms in a statute are presumed to have been used in their legal sense. See,
e.g., Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 609 (1973); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51-55 (1911) (common-law meaning); Thorn v. Browne, 257 F.
519, 523 (8th Cir. 1919) (statutes, previously interpreted by courts, possess "a well-under-
stood meaning and legal effect").
123. See, e.g., Lehigh & New England Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 540
F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977); State v. Anderson, 81 Wash.
2d 234, 501 P.2d 184 (1972).
124. See infra appendix at § 11(1).
125. See DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 99, at §§ 4-3.2(a), 4-3.1(a).
Section 4-3.1(a) provides: "As soon as practicable the lawyer should seek to determine
all relevant facts known to the accused. In so doing, the lawyer should probe for all
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Counsel has a duty to act as quickly as possible to contact his client
and ascertain the client's position. This is a vital stage of represen-
tation because it is the stage at which the attorney-client relation-
ship is first formed. If counsel fails to create a satisfactory
relationship at a time when his client is particularly vulnerable, the
client may harbor feelings of anger and mistrust which continue
throughout the case. Additionally, this is in many cases the time
when the client is able to give the most accurate recitation of the
facts, thus aiding counsel's investigation of the case. A failure to
interview the client at this stage may well make counsel's task
more difficult and jeopardize his client's case.
To fulfill his duty, counsel must establish a bond of trust with
the client. Explanations of the need for full disclosure and the con-
fidential nature of the attorney-client privilege are essential to this
task. Without such explanations, a client is forced to speculate as
to the consequences of his honest recitation of the facts. Human
nature and common experience tend to suggest that, when an indi-
vidual is placed in this position, trust falls victim to suspicion, ig-
norance and insecurity. Counsel has a duty to take affirmative
steps to avoid this eventuality.
A conflict between an attorney's interests and those of his client
may violate professional ethics126 and create a basis for an allega-
tion of ineffective assistance.' 27 Subsection II(l)(b) of the Guide-
legally relevant information without seeking to influence the direction of the client's re-
sponses."
Section 4-3.2(a) provides:
Defense counsel should seek to establish a relationship of trust and confidence
with the accused. The lawyer should explain the necessity of full disclosure of
all facts known to the client for an effective defense, and he should explain the
obligation of confidentiality which makes privileged the accused's disclosures
relating to the case.
126. MODEL CODE, supra note 114, at Canon 5 ("a lawyer should exercise indepen-
dent professional judgment on behalf of a client"); see also Geer, Representation of Multi-
ple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the
Defense Attorney, 62 MINN. L. REV. 119 (1978).
127. See Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039,
2046-47 (1984); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas,
435 U.S. 475, 481-87 (1978).
The Defense Function Standards echo these conclusions:
(a) At the earliest feasible opportunity defense counsel should disclose to the
defendant any interest in or connection with the case or any other matter that
might be relevant to the defendant's selection of a lawyer to represent him or
her.
(b) Except for preliminary matters such as initial hearings or applications for
bail, a lawyer or lawyers who are associated in practice should not undertake to
defend more than one defendant in the same criminal case if the duty to one of
the defendants may conflict with the duty to another. The potential for conflict
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lines establishes a standard of conduct that addresses this issue.
This standard mandates counsel's withdrawal whenever a conflict
exists. While it may be argued, with some merit, that not every
conflict is of such significance as to require withdrawal, it is better
practice to err on the side of caution. This protects the defendant's
rights and eliminates any danger that the conflict will later haunt
counsel in the form of an allegation of ineffective assistance.
Counsel must determine whether a conflict exists at the earliest
stage of representation. By addressing the issue at the preliminary
stage, counsel is in the best position to prevent any damage to the
defendant. It is far better to have other counsel appointed or re-
tained at this juncture than at a later stage of the case. The duty to
inquire as to a possible conflict, and to act appropriately if one is
discovered, continues throughout the life of the case.
The period immediately following arrest is a time at which a
defendant, unaware of his legal rights, may damage his case by, for
example, making incriminating statements. Subsections 1(1 )(c)
and II(l)(d) of the Guidelines, by mandating that the attorney
keep his client fully informed, reduce the possibility of such an oc-
currence. 2 The duties set out in these provisions are grounded in
established methods of effective representation129 and legal ethics3 °
and are reflected in a number of the Defense Function Standards.'3
Complete information is vital to the defendant, who must make all
decisions of consequence other than certain decisions concerning
strategy and tactics. 3 2  A reasoned client decision requires as
much information and professional advice as is available. Counsel,
of interest in representing multiple defendants is so grave that ordinarily a law-
yer should decline to act for more than one of several codefendants except in
unusual situations when, after careful investigation, it is clear that:
(i) no conflict is likely to develop;
(ii) the several defendants give an informed consent to such multiple repre-
sentation; and
(iii) the consent is made a matter of judicial record.
DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 99, at §§ 4-3.5(a), 4-3.5(b).
128. See infra appendix at §§ II(l)(c), II(l)(d). Failure to do so may amount to inef-
fective assistance. See, e.g., Hawkman v. Parratt, 661 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir. 1981) (failure
to advise client about charges and defenses).
129. See A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DE-
FENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES §§ 35-37 (1967); F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATT, FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF CRIMINAL ADVOCACY §§ 51-73 (1974).
130. See MODEL CODE, supra note 114, at EC 7-8.
131. E.g., DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 99, at §§ 4-3.6, 4-3.8.
132. See infra appendix at §§ II(3)(a), II(3)(b); MODEL CODE, supra note 114, at EC
7-7; see also Jones v. Barnes, 436 U.S. 745 (1983); United States v. Moore, 554 F.2d 1086,
1902 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (counsel's duty to discuss tactical decisions with client).
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the repository of these commodities, has a duty to provide them to
his client.
Section II(1) of the Guidelines 133 acknowledges that clients need
to know that their cases are receiving sufficient attention. Too
often an attorney is preoccupied by the purely legal aspects of his
client's case. Though the quality of legal representation may be
excellent, the client, uninformed about the progress of the case,
may become hostile and distrustful. Such a client is difficult to
represent. An attorney who fulfills his section 11(1) duties avoids
this problem by keeping his client fully informed and by establish-
ing an attorney-client relationship based on confidence and trust.
B. Subsection II(2): 34 Pretrial Investigation and Preparation
Counsel's duty to adequately investigate and prepare his client's
defense rests on constitutional1 35 and ethical grounds.1 36 Inadequa-
cies at this stage of representation often lead to successful postcon-
viction challenges based on ineffective assistance. 37  Pretrial
conduct that gives rise to allegations of ineffective assistance in-
cludes counsel's inadequacies concerning investigation, 31 prepara-
tion, 39 pretrial motions"4 and guilty pleas.' 4 ' Since the quality of
133. See infra appendix at § 11(1).
134. See in fra appendix at § 11(2).
135. See Note, The Constitutional Mandate of Effective Assistance of Counsel.: The
Duty to Investigate, 6 HOSTRA L. REV. 245 (1977).
136. See MODEL CODE, supra note 114, at Canon 6, DR 6-101(1), (2), (3).
137. See generally Gard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel-Standards and Remedies,
41 Mo. L. REV. 483, 485 (1976); Note, Ineffectiveness of Counsel-The Duty to Make a
Reasonable Pretrial Investigation, 40 Mo. L. REV. 369 (1975).
138. Bell v. Georgia, 554 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1977) (failure to investigate alibi de-
fense); Burgess v. Griffin, 585 F. Supp. 1564 (W.D.N.C.) (failure to research law concern-
ing known defenses), offd, 743 F.2d 1064 (4th Cir. 1984); United States ex rel Lee v.
Rowe, 446 F. Supp. 1039 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (total lack of pretrial investigation); United
States ex rel. Mitchell v. La Vallee, 417 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y.) (failure to investigate
material witness and defendant's background), afd mem., 551 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976).
139. United States v. Goodwin, 531 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel.
Owens v. Mack, 383 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
140. LiPuma v. Commissioner, Dep't of Corrections, 560 F.2d 84 (2d Cir.) (failure to
file motion to suppress evidence), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977); Mason v. Balcom,
531 F.2d 717 (4th Cir.) (numerous errors committed by counsel prior to client's plea of
guilty), reh'g denied, 534 F.2d 1407 (4th Cir. 1976); Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 239
Pa. Super. 324, 361 A.2d 706 (1976) (failure to file motion to suppress confession). A
number of courts have held that the failure to file pretrial motions is a tactical decision
which, therefore, does not constitute ineffective assistance. United States v. Brown, 739
F.2d 1136 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 331 (1984); Murray v. Maggio, 736 F.2d 279
(5th Cir. 1984); Fornash v. Marshall, 686 F.2d 1179 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1042, reh'g denied, 461 U.S. 940 (1983); United States v. Crouthers, 669 F.2d 635
(10th Cir. 1982).
141. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Burgess v. Griffin, 585 F. Supp. 1564
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representation at this stage has a direct impact on adequacy of rep-
resentation at trial or during the entry of a plea, clear standards of
conduct are vital to protection of the defendant's rights.
Subsection II(2)(a) 4 2 defines the conduct required of counsel
during the investigative stage of the case. It mirrors the duties de-
scribed in the Defense Function Standards.143 It should be noted
that the duty to investigate continues regardless of whether the de-
fendant desires to plead guilty. This is significant because it is not
uncommon for an attorney to forego all but very cursory investiga-
tion once a client expresses such a desire. Yet, without the benefit
of adequate investigation by counsel, a defendant is unable to make
an informed decision concerning a plea.
The overwhelming majority of criminal cases are disposed of
without trial. Some are dismissed, others are diverted to an agency
or program outside the formal structure of the criminal justice sys-
tem and still others culminate in a plea of guilty. 44 Subsections
II(2)(b) and II(2)(c) detail counsel's responsibilities when he is
confronted with the option of disposing of the case without trial. 145
After pretrial investigation, it may become clear to counsel that
there is a high probability that his client will be convicted at trial.
At that point, counsel must inform his client of this and explain
whatever options are available. Depending on the circumstances,
these options might include sending the case to a pretrial diversion
program, entering a plea to a reduced charge or pleading guilty to
the original charge. Though counsel has a duty to give his client
the benefit of his expertise, the decision to pursue or not pursue
these options rests solely with the client.
(W.D.N.C.), affd, 743 F.2d 1064 (4th Cir. 1984). But see Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 790 (1970) (plea not open to attack if counsel's erroneous advice was within the
range of required competence).
142. See infra appendix at § II(2)(a).
143. The Defense Function Standards provide:
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circum-
stances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits
of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction. The investigation should
always include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution
and law enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless of
the accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt
or the accused's stated desire to plead guilty.
DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 99, at § 4-4.1.
144. Guilty pleas outnumber trials by about ten to one. See B. BOLAND & B. FORST,
THE PREVALENCE OF GUILTY PLEAS (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1984); see also Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
145. See infra appendix at §§ II(2)(b), II(2)(c); see also DEFENSE FUNCTION STAN-
DARDS, supra note 99, at § 4-6.1.
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Counsel in this situation must make certain that his client pos-
sesses the facts needed for an informed decision. This can be ac-
complished only if counsel provides his client with a clear
understanding of the potential options and the consequences that
may flow from them. 4 6 For example, though counsel is not ex-
pected to be able to estimate with accuracy the length of the sen-
tence his client might receive upon entry of a plea, he does have the
duty to give his client his informed, professional judgment.4 '
The American Bar Foundation in 1978 surveyed trial judges'
opinions about the quality of the lawyers practicing before them.148
The most frequently cited area of incompetence was pretrial prepa-
ration.1 49 However, trial court judges rarely become involved in
the evaluation of counsel's conduct at this stage-although, argua-
bly, they have a duty to do so.' 5 ° Subsection II(2)(c) of the Guide-
lines mandates trial judge involvement at the stage of the case
where counsel's ineffectiveness has the best chance of being discov-
ered and, possibly, remedied.' 51
Injecting the trial judge into the evaluation process at this stage
of the proceeding is rare, yet not unknown. 5 2  It has been dis-
146. People v. Dell, 60 A.D.2d 18, 400 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1977); Commonwealth v. Nap-
per, 254 Pa. Super. 54, 385 A.2d 521 (1978).
147. United States v. Crook, 607 F.2d 670 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 609 F.2d 1009
(5th Cir. 1979) (en banc). It must be noted that counsel's advice concerning the plea and
its consequences does not necessarily constitute ineffective assistance if it turns out to be
inaccurate. United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984); Hill v. Lockhart, 731 F.2d
568 (8th Cir.) (inaccurate advice, prior to entry of guilty plea, concerning defendant's
parole eligibility), ajT'don reh'g, 764 F.2d 1279 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd, 106 S. Ct.
366 (1985); Clark & Byrns, Hill v. Lockhart: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.- The
State's Position, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 83 (1985); Lassiter, Hill v. Lockhart: Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel The Defendant's Position, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73 (1985).
148. Maddi, Trial Advocacy Competence: The Judicial Perspective, 1978 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 105. The survey included over 1400 federal and state judges of
general jurisdiction. Though the responding judges reflected a broad range of geographic,
demographic and other variables, the factors used in evaluating advocacy competence
were relatively uniform. Id. at 130-37.
149. Id. at 125.
150. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272 (1981); McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771 (1970); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942); Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932). In some cases, a trial judge's failure to protect a defend-
ant's right to effective assistance may require reversal of the conviction. Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-48 (1980) (failure to inquire about an apparent conflict of
interest).
151. See infra appendix at § II(2)(c).
152. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Report: January 13, 1965, reprinted
in 36 F.R.D. 277, 338 (1965), for a "checklist," provided by The United States District
Court for the District of Maryland, which describes specific duties counsel must fulfill in
preparing for trial. Several courts have suggested adoption of similar lists of duties. See,
e.g., United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 205-10 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Coles v. Peyton,
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cussed by many commentators. 5 3 Because there is little evidence
to suggest that the judiciary, acting on its own, will increase its
participation in this area, these duties must be imposed by statute.
This subsection gives to the trial judge the responsibility of mon-
itoring counsel's preparation prior to the entry of a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere, or the beginning of a trial. Such preparation will
be detailed in an affidavit to be submitted to the judge by counsel.
The standards to be applied in evaluating counsel's affidavit will be
those set out in subsections II(2)(a) and II(2)(b) of the Guide-
lines. ' 4 This allows the judge to compare counsel's preparation
with minimum standards of preparedness.
The evaluation process may take a number of forms. However,
it is suggested that the most efficient and effective vehicle is a pre-
trial conference. 155 The conference between counsel and the trial
judge would follow a preset agenda 15 6 which might include discus-
sion of the substantive factual and legal issues, the prosecution's
case, possible defenses, the status of discovery and potential evi-
dentiary problems. All of these matters will, of course, be ad-
dressed in counsel's affidavit. However, as noted in subsection
II(2), 157 counsel will not be required to reveal anything which
might jeopardize his client's rights or violate the attorney-client
privilege. At the conclusion of the conference, the trial judge will
be able to determine whether counsel adequately discharged his
duties during the pretrial stage of the proceedings. If the judge
determines that counsel has fulfilled his duties, the case moves on
to the next stage.
What are the consequences of a finding that counsel's prepara-
tion has fallen below the minimum standard? Depending on the
seriousness of counsel's deficiencies, the judge has a number of op-
tions. In the case of shortcomings that are remediable, the judge
may advise or direct counsel concerning appropriate remedies.
389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968); Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d
256, 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Ercolino, 65 N.J. Super. 20, 27-28, 166 A.2d
797, 803 (1961).
153. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 93, at 830-31; Finer, supra note 62, at 1115; Le-
vine, Toward Competent Counsel, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 227, 253-68 (1982); Schwarzer, Deal-
ing with Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARV. L. REV. 633, 649-65
(1980).
154. See infra appendix at §§ II(2)(a), II(2)(b); supra notes 142-45 and accompanying
text.
155. See generally ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL §§ 11-5.3, 11-5.4 (2d ed. 1980).
156. For a sample agenda, see Schwarzer, supra note 153, at 655-58.
157. See infra appendix at § H1(2).
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This is a common and accepted practice among the judiciary.15 8
The judge can then monitor the case to confirm that the remedial
measures have been taken.
More dramatic options will have to be considered if it becomes
clear that the shortcomings are so serious that they create the risk
of ineffective assistance. In such cases, the judge should advise the
defendant of this conclusion and explain that he has the right to
retain other counsel or, if indigent, to have counsel appointed for
him by the court. If the defendant refuses to act on the court's
advice, at least two options are available to the court: (1) the court
may require that current counsel be assisted by a qualified trial
attorney chosen by current counsel or the court,15 9 or (2) the court
may remove ineffective counsel and appoint new counsel or require
the defendant to retain different counsel. While this drastic step
may appear to violate a defendant's right to retain counsel of his
choice, 160 the right is not absolute.16 ' Courts have forced the sub-
stitution of counsel where conduct was so disruptive or incompe-
tent as to impede the orderly administration of justice 6 2 or where
conduct jeopardized the client's right to effective representation. 163
Though barring counsel from participation in the case may raise an
additional issue, '6 the court's primary responsibility is to protect
158. See Maddi, supra note 148, at 129.
159. See United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192, 203-04 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
872 (1977).
160. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (defendant with financial means
has right to reasonable opportunity to secure counsel of choice); United States v. Burton,
584 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1977).
Substitution of counsel may present less of a constitutional problem where the defend-
ant is represented by appointed counsel. See Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 753 (5th Cir.
1984) (indigent defendant does not have right to be represented by counsel of his choice).
161. Although the sixth amendment right to counsel is absolute, an accused's right to
counsci of his choice is not. United States v. Magee, 741 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1984); United
States v. James, 708 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1983).
162. United States v. Dinitz, 538 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir.) (counsel barred from case due
to his repeated acts of courtroom misconduct), reh'g denied, 542 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.
1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977).
163. United States v. Rogers, 471 F. Supp. 847, 855-56 (E.D.N.Y.) (counsel disquali-
fied by trial judge for incompetence), affd sub nom. United States v. Raife, 607 F.2d 1000
(2d Cir. 1979); Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1105 (D.C. App. 1978) ("Gross
incompetence... of counsel... may justify the court's removal of an attorney, even over
the defendant's objection.").
164. Membership in the bar of a federal court is a constitutionally protected right.
Membership cannot be withdrawn-even if it is limited to participation in one case-
without affording the attorney a hearing that meets the requirements of procedural due
process. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968); Theard v. United
States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957); Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46 (1916). The right of a non-
member attorney to appear pro hac vice is determined by the law of the forum. See, e.g.,
Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam).
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the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.
C. Subsection II(3):165 Conduct of Litigation
A trial takes place because the defendant has exhausted or re-
jected all other methods for resolving the case; it is a last resort.
Because the defendant's fate rests largely in the hands of counsel, it
is not surprising that so many claims of ineffective assistance focus
on counsel's conduct of litigation. Subsection 11(3) of the Guide-
lines articulates a set of duties by which such claims may be
judged. 166
1. The Decisionmaking Process
The first provision in this section addresses allocation of deci-
sionmaking power in the conduct of litigation. Subsection
II(3)(a) 161 is modeled after a similar provision in the Defense Func-
tion Standards.16 Decisionmaking powers that relate to trial strat-
egy and tactics rest solely with counsel. 169 Those that concern the
three decisions enumerated below rest exclusively with the defend-
ant.1 70  This division of power is grounded in the realities of trial
practice and in constitutional considerations.
The trial of a criminal case is not amenable to scientific laws or
165. See infra appendix at § HI(3).
166. Id.
167. See infra appendix at § II(3)(a).
168. The DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 99, at § 4-5.2(a) provide:
Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the ac-
cused and others are ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions which are to
be made by the accused after full consultation with counsel are: (i) what plea to
enter; (ii) whether to waive jury trial; and (iii) whether to testify in his or her
own behalf.
169. "Trial strategy and tactics" refer to actions taken by counsel in the process of
litigation to maximize the potential for a successful outcome. They are decisions that
require counsel to make discretionary judgments. Courts are hesitant to "second guess"
the legitimacy of such decisions. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Huckstead v. Greer, 737
F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1984); Riley v. Wyrick, 712 F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1983). Even if, in
hindsight, the decisions were wrong, courts seldom find that they constitute ineffective
assistance as long as they were the product of an informed, reasoned decisionmaking
process. See, e.g., Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); Shraiar v. United
States, 736 F.2d 817 (1st Cir. 1984); Griffin v. Wainwright, 588 F. Supp. 1549 (M.D. Fla.
1984), afj'd in part, remanded in part, 760 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1985). Butsee Kellogg v.
Scurr, 741 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1984) (simply labeling the action at issue "trial strategy"
does not automatically immunize an attorney from a charge of ineffective assistance).
170. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753 n.6 (1983) (reaffirms defendant's right to
make these decisions, citing MODEL RULES, supra note 114, at Rule 1.2(a)); Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (defendant's right to testify); Machibroda v. United
States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962) (decision as to what plea to enter); Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) (decision concerning waiver of jury trial).
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formulas. It is more analogous to the artistic process in that while
the trial takes place within the framework of well-defined laws and
procedures, the end product is, essentially, the "creation" of the
defense attorney. Whether he is successful depends primarily on
the facts at his disposal and the artfulness of his presentation of
these facts. Thus counsel must be free, using his informed judg-
ment, to present his case in the manner which he believes will most
benefit his client. To allow a client to control this process would
undercut the essential role of the trial attorney.17 Although in
many cases the defendant is bound by counsel's tactical deci-
sions 172 even when they are wrong, 17 3 the nature of the trial process
demands this allocation of decisionmaking power. 174
It must be noted that counsel's decisionmaking process is not
intended to take place in a vacuum. He has a duty to consult with
his client before acting. However, if the decision concerns tactics
and strategy, the ultimate decision rests with counsel. Three deci-
sions are deemed so significant that only the defendant may make
them. The first of these concerns the nature of the plea. Though
an accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel in deciding the
nature of his plea, 175 the decision is the defendant's. 176 The second
decision is whether to waive the right to a trial by jury. 17 7 The final
decision is whether the defendant will testify in his own behalf. 78
171. The primary function of a defense attorney is to act as an objective, informed
advocate. To fulfill this function, counsel must be allowed free reign to make judgments
concerning trial strategy. Allowing a defendant to limit this power would make defense
counsel superfluous in the trial process. See MODEL CODE, supra note 114, at DR 7-
101(B)(1) (right to exercise professional judgment).
172. See, e.g., Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); Wallace v. Lockhart,
701 F.2d 719 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 934 (1983).
173. See, e.g., Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451-52 (1965) (defendant bound by
counsel's tactical decision to forego an objection available on constitutional grounds).
174. See MODEL CODE, supra note 114, at EC 7-7 ("the authority to make [such]
decisions is exclusively that of the client, and if made within the framework of the law,
such decisions are binding on his lawyer"). But see Id. at DR 7-101(B)(1) ("In his repre-
sentation of a client, a lawyer may ... [w]here permissible exercise his professional judg-
ment to waive or fail to assert a right or position of his client.").
175. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14-1.3(a) (2d ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as GUILTY PLEA STANDARDS].
176. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969); see also GUILTY PLEA STAN-
DARDS, supra note 175, at §§ 14-1.5, 14-3.2.
177. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930); see also ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 15-1.2 (2d ed.
1980).
178. As noted in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971), a defendant has the
right to testify. This right is acknowledged in the DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS,
supra note 99, at § 4-5.2(a), and MODEL CODE, supra note 114, at EC 7-7, 7-8.
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All of these decisions are critical, and all will have a direct and
dramatic impact on the defendant. Consequently, he must have
the power and the responsibility to make these decisions.
There is one qualification, however, that must be met before the
defendant may be armed with this decisionmaking power-a quali-
fication fraught with significant ethical and constitutional consider-
ations. The defendant must be mentally competent to make these
important decisions.
It is well established that a defendant who suffers from a signifi-
cant mental impairment cannot be forced to enter a plea179 or stand
trial, ' and cannot be executed.'' These laws apply when a signif-
icant mental impairment severely limits a defendant's ability to un-
derstand and effectively participate in the proceedings.8 2 Such
cases are relatively easy to resolve. However, what is counsel's re-
sponsibility in the decisionmaking process when his client has a
mental, emotional or intellectual impairment that is not so signifi-
cant as to make him legally incompetent to stand trial, but is of
such a degree as to make him, in counsel's opinion, incompetent to
make the decisions discussed above? Though the problem is not
uncommon, there are very few detailed rules to guide counsel in
resolving this issue. Counsel may, however, look to the American
Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility (the "Code")
for some general guidance.183
Canon 7 of the Code mandates that "a lawyer should represent a
client zealously within the bounds of the law."'8 4 Ethical Consid-
erations 7-11185 and 7-12' 86 discuss counsel's responsibilities to-
179. Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1981); Spikes v. United States,
633 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 934 (1981).
180. Bishop v. United States, 223 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
181. This principle of law is well established in all state jurisdictions by either statu-
tory or common law. See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14-26 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1053 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1237 (1983). However, whether constitutional "due process bars the execution of an in-
sane person.., is an open question which the Supreme Court of the United States has not
decided .. " Welch v. Beto, 355 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1966). See Gray, 710 F.2d at
1053-56; see also Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently Incom-
petent, 32 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1980); Note, Insanity of the Condemned, 88 YALE L.J. 533
(1979).
182. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 712 (1972); Dusky v. United States, 362
U.S. 402 (1960).
183. See generally MODEL CODE, supra note 114, at Canon 7.
184. Id.
185. There is no counterpart to EC 7-11 in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
See MODEL RULES, supra note 114.
186. There is no counterpart to EC 7-12 in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
See Id. at Rule 1-14 (Code Comparison).
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ward a client who is mentally deficient or disabled. However, the
Code lacks specific guidelines to be followed in such cases. Ethical
Consideration 7-11 simply states that counsel's responsibilities
"may vary according to the intelligence, experience, mental condi-
tion or age of a client ... or the nature of a particular proceeding.
Examples include the representation of . . . an incompetent."''8 7
Ethical Consideration 7-12 suggests that counsel may, at times, "be
compelled in court proceedings to make decisions on behalf of the
client" and in such instances counsel should "consider all circum-
stances" and act to "safeguard and advance the interests of the
client."' 8  It is obvious that these broad dictates fail to resolve the
legal issue at hand.
Though the issue is fraught with constitutional concerns, it is the
intent of the Guidelines to allow counsel to liberally interpret and
apply these ethical provisions in resolving conflicts relating to the
decisionmaking process. In "borderline" situations, counsel must
exercise informed judgment to save his client from making a deci-
sion the consequences of which may be damaging and
irreparable. 189
Total agreement between counsel and client concerning the deci-
sionmaking process is an ideal to be sought, but disagreements in
this context are not uncommon. If such a conflict is not resolved,
an unsuccessful defendant may use it as a ground for an allegation
187. The Model Code does not define the term "incompetent." This is significant in
that this term has a variety of meanings in the context of civil and criminal law. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. State, 54 Ariz. 387, 96 P.2d 281 (1939) (discussion of terms such as "incom-
petent," "incapable" and "lunacy"); In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 484-86 (Fla. 1977)
(discussion of concept of "mental illness"); State ex rel Leeb v. Wilson, 27 Ohio App. 2d
1, 272 N.E.2d 363 (1971) ("legal" insanity versus "medical" insanity); see also Hagel,
Representing the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, 27 AM. JUR. MODEL TRIALS 8-
23 (1980).
188. EC 7-12 concludes that "obviously a lawyer cannot perform any act or make
any decision which the law requires his client to perform or make, either acting for him-
self if competent, or by a duly constituted representative if legally incompetent." MODEL
CODE, supra note 114, at EC 7-12. This statement appears to directly contradict other
provisions of EC 7-12.
These Ethical Considerations place counsel in a position where no matter what action
he takes he may violate the Model Code and deprive his client of effective assistance. It is
suggested that he rely on the provisions of DR 7-101(B)(1) when faced with such a di-
lemma: "In his representation of a client, a lawyer may ... [w]here permissible, exercise
his professional judgment to waive or fail to assert a right or position of his client."
MODEL CODE, supra note 114, at DR 7-101(B)(1). The sad fact remains that counsel
may have to face an allegation of ineffective assistance in order to know whether an
appellate court agrees that reliance on this provision is justified.
189. See Mazor, Power and Responsibility in the Attorney-Client Relationship, 20
STAN. L. REV. 1120 (1968).
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of ineffective assistance. 190 Therefore, the best interests of both cli-
ent and counsel demand resolution of the conflict before the case
continues. Subsection 1I(3)(b) of the Guidelines suggests proce-
dures for conflict resolution.' 9 '
When a conflict arises, counsel should attempt to resolve it by
discussing the matter with his client. An accurate record should be
made of these discussions. The Guidelines suggest the minimum
content of this record. The record will, in the event of an allega-
tion of ineffective assistance, assist the court in determining the
truth of the allegation. If the conflict is resolved by discussion then
the case will proceed. If it is not, counsel must take additional
steps toward its resolution.
If the conflict is so significant that it undermines counsel's ability
to render effective assistance, he must take steps to remove himself
from the case. 19 2 Prior to doing this, counsel must discuss the mat-
ter with his client and advise him of his right to seek other counsel.
The substance of this discussion must be recorded. If the client
decides to seek other counsel, counsel must inform the trial judge
of this decision.
Once the court is made aware of the conflict, it should conduct
an inquiry to determine if bona fide grounds for a change of coun-
sel exist. 9 3 Whether counsel is retained or appointed should be
irrelevant to the decision.' 94 If the court determines that the con-
190. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Pugach v. Mancusi, 310 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), affid, 441 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 849 (1971). But see United
States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir.) (a difference of opinion with respect to trial
tactics does not constitute ineffective assistance); reh'g denied sub nom. Dondich v.
United States, 454 U.S. 1127 (1981); United States ex rel. Curtis v. Illinois, 521 F.2d 717,
719 (7th Cir.) (defendant by refusing to cooperate with his attorney may constructively
waive his right to challenge his representation on ground of ineffective assistance), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1023 (1975). Accord Williams v. United States, 295 A.2d 503 (D.C.
App. 1972).
191. See infra appendix at § II(3)(b). This section reflects the language and intent of
the DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 99, at § 4-5.2(c):
If a disagreement on significant matters of tactics or strategy arises between the
lawyer and the client, the lawyer should make a record of the circumstances,
the lawyer's advice and reasons, and the conclusion reached. The record should
be made in a manner which protects the confidentiality of the lawyer-client
relationship.
192. See MODEL CODE, supra note 114, at Canon 5.
193. United States v. Woods, 487 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Calabro, 467 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973); see also ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE SPECIAL FUNC-
TIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 6-2.5 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as TRIAL JUDGE
STANDARDS] (judge's duty to respect attorney-client relationship).
194. McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 217 n.14 (8th Cir. 1974); Monroe v. United
States, 389 A.2d 811, 819-20 (D.C. App.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978).
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flict jeopardizes the defendant's right to effective assistance, it
should allow counsel to withdraw. The defendant can then retain
new counsel. If he is unable to do so, the court should appoint
counsel for him. 195
2. Duties at Trial
Over the years, various proposals have been proffered to deline-
ate the proper scope of counsel's duties at trial. 196 Since so many of
counsel's actions are based on strategic and tactical considerations,
these proposals have fallen short of their goal. The following pro-
visions of the Guidelines are premised on the acknowledgement
that specific duties may very well be impossible to delineate.
Subsection II(3)(c) articulates, in rather broad terms, counsel's
duties during the trial process.197 Most of the duties reflect norma-
tive conduct as described in the Defense Function Standards.1 98
Each of the seven provisions deals with trial behavior that is fre-
quently the subject of allegations of ineffective assistance. 99
The goals of this subsection are three-fold. First, it informs the
defendant of the behavior he has a right to expect from his attor-
ney. Second, it provides counsel with a set of duties that define the
scope of his responsibilities to his client at trial. Finally, it pro-
vides both trial and appellate courts with uniform criteria for use
in adjudicating ineffective assistance claims.
a. Courtroom Decorum
The first of these duties concerns counsel's decorum when inter-
acting with the trial judge, opposing counsel, witnesses and ju-
195. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-48 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.
475, 484-86 (1978); Wilson v. Morris, 724 F.2d 591 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
2357 (1984).
196. Levine, supra note 153, at 227; Smithburn & Springmann, Effective Assistance of
Counsel: In Quest of a Uniform Standard of Review, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497
(1981); Comment, The Standard for Effective Assistance of Counsel in Pennsylvania-An
Ineffective Method of Ensuring Competent Defense Representation, 86 DICK L. REV. 41
(1981).
197. See infra appendix at § II(3)(c).
198. DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 99, at §§ 4-7.1-4-7.10.
199. The Guidelines do not attempt to describe specifically every potential act or
omission that could be the basis of such an allegation. The intent of this subsection is to
categorically define counsel's duties so that courts, with the assistance of precedent, the
preamble and other sources, will be able to resolve these issues with some degree of objec-
tivity and uniformity. See Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482 (1984); Kordel v.
United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349 (1948) (a statute must be interpreted so as not to defeat
its purpose "by creating exceptions from or loopholes in it").
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rors.200 It addresses two concerns, one ethical, the other
pragmatic. Counsel, as an officer of the court, has an ethical duty
to conduct himself within the bounds of appropriate behavior.2 °'
Though what is "appropriate" may differ somewhat according to
local practice, the concept is generally defined by the Code,2 02 the
Defense Function Standards,20 3 and common law.2" Violation of
this duty may, of course, be grounds for a disciplinary proceeding.
Inappropriate conduct may have consequences other than those
that accompany a violation of professional ethics-it may ad-
versely affect the client's case. One such consequence might be the
barring of counsel from the courtroom.20 5 Furthermore, there is
evidence which suggests that counsel's conduct influences a jury's
perception of the merits of a case. 206 Thus counsel's offensive or
inappropriate conduct may have a significant negative impact on
the trier of fact. Counsel's conduct may in fact be so egregious that
it constitutes ineffective assistance.20 7
200. See infra appendix at § II(3)(c)(i); see also DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS,
supra note 99, at §§ 4-7.2, 4-7.3.
201. The Model Code addresses this issue in a number of Ethical Considerations. See
MODEL CODE, supra note 114, at EC 7-36 to EC 7-39. It also defines specific duties and
prohibitions in the Disciplinary Rules. See Id. at DR 7-106 to DR 7-109. The Model
Rules contain similar provisions. See MODEL RULES, supra note 114, at Rules 3.1-3.6.
202. See MODEL CODE, supra note 114, at DR 7-102.
203. DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 99, at §§ 4-7.1 to 4-7.3.
204. See, e.g., Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952); Hanley v. Condrey, 467
F.2d 697, 699-700 (2d Cir. 1972); Cherry Creek Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,
207 A.D. 787, 790-91, 202 N.Y.S. 611, 614 (1924).
205. Courts have inherent authority to deal with an attorney's courtroom miscon-
duct. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978); Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. 364
(1868); United States v. Dinitz, 538 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104
(1977); see also United States v. Pinkney, 551 F.2d 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (trial judge has
affirmative duty to maintain proper standards of representation in his court); TRIAL
JUDGE STANDARDS, supra note 193, at § 6-3.3 (judge's use of his powers to maintain
order).
206. See F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATT, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES FOR CRIMINAL
TRIALS §§ 7.1-8.19 (2d ed. 1985); F. LANE, GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE §§ 9.49-9.62
(3d ed. 1984); Costopoulos, Persuasion in the Courtroom, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 384, 397-402
(1972); Hayes, Applying Persuasion Techniques in Trial Proceedings, 24 S.C.L. REV. 380
(1972).
207. See, e.g., Wilson v. Mintzes, 733 F.2d 424, 425-27 nn.1, 2 (6th Cir.) (argument
between defense counsel and judge; hostile comments in presence of jury), vacated, 105 S.
Ct. 317 (1984); Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1984) (sleeping through
substantial portions of the trial); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974)
(unjustifiable trial tactics; failure to raise available defenses); Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120
F.2d 962, 966-68 (10th Cir.) (intoxication at trial), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 617 (1941);
People v. Jenkins, 297 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Mich. App. 1980) (Counsel left courtroom dur-
ing voir dire and prosecution's closing argument; conducted cross-examination damaging
to defendant; told defendant he could not testify, plead to lesser charge or present wit-
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b. Evidence and Defenses
The next duty concerns counsel's responsibility to proffer rele-
vant evidence and raise valid defenses.2"' This duty goes to the
very heart of the trial process. There may, of course, be tactical
considerations which justify not offering certain evidence or raising
certain defenses. If counsel, for example, reasonably believes that a
piece of evidence or a defense, though arguably relevant, might be
detrimental to the presentation of the defense, his decision not to
introduce it does not necessarily constitute ineffective assistance.20 9
This is true even if, judging by hindsight, counsel was wrong.210
However, an unjustified failure to introduce relevant evidence or
raise valid defenses may amount to ineffective assistance.2 1
c. Examination of Witnesses and Jurors
The third duty set out in the Guidelines concerns the examina-
tion of witnesses and prospective jurors.212 This duty is not abso-
lute.21 3 It must be interpreted relative to counsel's strategy in
presenting his case. If counsel's decision to limit or forego exami-
nation of a witness or prospective juror is due to reasonable tactical
nesses. "Rarely does the trial record so graphically depict a defense counsel falling short
of the standard as in the instant case.").
208. See infra appendix at § II(3)(c)(ii).
209. See Fornash v. Marshall, 686 F.2d 1179 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1042 (1983); United States ex rel. Walker v. Henderson, 492 F.2d 1311 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 972 (1974); Poole v. United States, 438 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1971).
210. Shraiar v. United States, 736 F.2d 817, 818 (1st Cir. 1984); Griffin v. Wain-
wright, 588 F. Supp. 1549 (M.D. Fla. 1984), affid in part, remanded in part, 760 F.2d
1505 (11th Cir. 1985).
211. See Wood v. Zahradnick, 578 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1978) (lack of mental capacity);
Bell v. Georgia, 554 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1977) (alibi defense); Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d
619 (5th Cir. 1967) (insanity defense); see also Jones v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 347, 353
(4th Cir.) (quoting Von Maltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948)), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 832 (1963):
Of course, it is not for a lawyer to fabricate defenses, but he does have an affirm-
ative obligation to make suitable inquiry to determine whether valid ones exist.
Such a duty is imposed for the salutary reason that "[p]rior to trial an accused
is entitled to rely upon his counsel to make an independent examination of the
facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws involved and then to offer his informed
opinion as to what plea should be entered."
See Solomon v. Kemp, 735 F.2d 395 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (for tactical decisions to consti-
tute ineffective assistance they must be so ill-chosen as to render the trial fundamentally
unfair), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 940 (1985); Wilson v. Cowan, 578 F.2d 166 (6th Cir.
1978) (if the trial strategy is unreasonable, relative to the facts of the case, its implementa-
tion constitutes ineffective assistance).
212. See infra appendix at § II(3)(c)(iii).
213. United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1984) (examination of witnesses
is a tactical decision left to the discretion of defense counsel); Charles v. Foltz, 741 F.2d
834 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 970 (1985).
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considerations, it is unlikely that this decision will later be deemed
ineffective assistance.2 14 Unless such a justification is present, how-
ever, failure to adequately examine a prospective juror or witness
may constitute ineffective assistance.2 15
d. Defendant's Testimony
Defendants have the right to testify in their own behalf.216 As
stated in the Guidelines, 217 counsel has a duty to assist his client in
the realization of that right. However, counsel's responsibilities in
this regard are subject to constitutional, ethical and tactical
considerations.
The first consideration, constitutional in nature, involves the
protection afforded the defendant against self-incrimination. 21  If
he testifies in his own behalf he waives this protection. 1 9 On the
other hand, a failure to testify may adversely affect his case.
Though the prosecutor cannot directly comment on the defend-
ant's failure to testify, 220 judges and juries often perceive the de-
fendant's silence as suggesting guilt.22' Counsel must explain these
factors to his client so the client can make an informed decision.
This duty to advise222 raises a number of issues of professional
ethics regarding the client's desire to testify. The most trouble-
some of these concerns counsel's duty when a defendant expresses
214. C. TESSMER, CRIMINAL TRIAL STRATEGY 95 (1968).
215. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318
(1974); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970); King v. Beto, 305 F. Supp.
636, 637 (S.D. Tex. 1969), affd, 429 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 936
(1971); People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1st Dist. 1978) (failed
to call a single witness); People v. Schulman, 299 Ill. 125, 132 N.E. 530 (1921).
216. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
217. See infra appendix at § II(3)(c)(iv).
218. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (general discussion of
privilege); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege applicable to defendants in state
prosecutions).
219. Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968) (waiver by taking the stand).
220. Frontaine v. California, 390 U.S. 593 (1968); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965). But see United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (in certain situations, the
prosecutor's comment on defendant's failure to testify may be harmless error); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
221. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956) ("Too many, even those
who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too
readily assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in
claiming the privilege.").
222. See MODEL CODE, supra note 114, at EC 7-8 ("A lawyer should advise his client
of the possible effect of each legal alternative .... He may emphasize the possibility of
harsh consequences that might result from assertion of legally permissible positions.");
see also MODEL RULES, supra note 114, at Rule 2.1 (advisor), Rule 1.2(a) (scope of
representation).
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a desire to give perjured testimony.223 On one hand, counsel must
preserve the confidences and secrets of his client2 24 and zealously
represent him within the bounds of the law.225 On the other hand,
counsel is prohibited from knowingly using perjured testimony.226
The ultimate question, of course, is how to fulfill both obligations
without undercutting the defendant's case. This issue has been de-
bated for years.227  Though commentators have suggested a
number of solutions,228 the Defense Function Standards present an
approach which arguably protects both the interests of the client
and the professional integrity of counsel.229
The final consideration in this area is tactical. It arises in situa-
223. See generally Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966); Wolfram, Client
Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809 (1977).
224. MODEL CODE, supra note 114, at Canon 4, DR 4-101; see also MODEL RULES,
supra note 114, at Rule 1.6. See generally Callan & David, Professional Responsibility
and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System,
29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332 (1976). See Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978)
(informing court of client's perjury constitutes ineffective assistance).
225. See MODEL CODE, supra note 114, at Canon 7, DR 7-101, 7-102; see also
MODEL RULES, supra note 114, at Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3.
226. See MODEL CODE, supra note 114, at DR 7-102(A)(4) ("In his representation of
a client, a lawyer shall not.., knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence."). But
see DR 7-102(B)(1) (duty of attorney when he knows that his client "perpetrated a fraud
upon a person or tribunal"; attorney cannot act if "the information is protected as a
privileged communication"). See also MODEL RULES, supra note 114, at Rule 1.2
(though the rule impliedly addresses this issue, it fails to resolve it); DEFENSE FUNCTION
STANDARDS, supra note 99, at § 4-7.5 (presentation of evidence).
227. See M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975);
Brazil, Unanticipated Client Perjury and Collision of Rules of Ethics, Evidence, and Con-
stitutional Law, 44 Mo. L. REV. 601 (1979). Courts have struggled with this issue as
well. See, e.g., Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 730-32 (9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstedler, J.,
concurring) (due process and ineffective assistance analysis); United States ex rel. Wilcox
v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 120-22 (3d Cir. 1977) (due process analysis).
228. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 227, at 27-41; Brazil, supra note 227, at 601-50;
Erickson, The Perjurious Defendant: A Proposed Solution to the Defense Lawyer's Con-
flicting Ethical Obligations to the Court and His Client, 59 DEN. L.J. 75 (1981); FREED-
MAN, supra note 223, at 1475-78; Wolfram, supra note 223, at 842-66. This problem has
plagued the criminal justice system since the founding of the republic. Recently, the
Supreme Court resolved much of the uncertainty regarding the appropriate limits of
counsel's behavior. In Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986), the Court held that "an
attorney's duty of confidentiality, which totally covers the client's admission of guilt, does
not extend to a client's announced plans to engage in future criminal conduct [in this
case, perjury]." Id. at 998. However, the Court observed that, as previously stated in this
article, "we may need to define with greater precision the weight to be given to recog-
nized canons of ethics, the standards established by the State in statutes or professional
codes, and the Sixth Amendment, in defining the proper scope and limits on that con-
duct." Id. at 994.
229. See DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDNARDS, supra note 99, at § 4-7.7:
(a) If the defendant has admitted to defense counsel facts which establish guilt
and counsel's independent investigation established that the admissions are true
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tions where potential perjury by the defendant is not an issue.
What is counsel's duty when the client demands that he be allowed
to testify even though counsel strenuously advises against it? This
problem should be dealt with by applying the provisions of the
Guidelines concerning such conflicts,23 ° as well as by referring to
the applicable provisions of the Code 231 and the Defense Function
Standards.23 2 In the final analysis, counsel fulfills his duty by giv-
ing his client the benefit of his expertise. If the client fails to follow
counsel's advice, then he must bear the consequences.233
e. Motions and Objections
One of the primary functions of trial counsel is to offer appropri-
ate motions and objections. Their use is vital to protection of the
client's rights. Consequently, the Guidelines create an affirmative
duty to use these devices when appropriate.234
Several courts have found ineffective assistance where counsel
but the defendant insists on the right to trial, counsel must strongly discourage
the defendant against taking the witness stand to testify perjuriously.
(b) If, in advance of trial, the defendant insists that he or she will take the
stand to testify perjuriously, the lawyer may withdraw from the case, if that is
feasible, seeking leave of the court if necessary, but the court should not be
advised of the lawyer's reason for seeking to do so.
(c) If withdrawal from the case is not feasible or is not permitted by the court,
or if the situation arises immediately preceding trial or during the trial and the
defendant insists upon testifying perjuriously in his or her own behalf, it is un-
professional conduct for the lawyer to lend aid to the perjury or use the per-
jured testimony. Before the defendant takes the stand in these circumstances,
the lawyer should make a record of the fact that the defendant is taking the
stand against the advice of counsel in some appropriate manner without re-
vealing the fact to the court. The lawyer may identify the witness as the defend-
ant and may ask appropriate questions of the defendant when it is believed that
the defendant's answers will not be perjurious. As to matters for which it is
believed the defendant will offer perjurious testimony, the lawyer should seek to
avoid direct examination of the defendant in the conventional manner; instead,
the lawyer should ask the defendant if he or she wishes to make any additional
statement concerning the case to the trier or triers of the facts. A lawyer may
not later argue the defendant's known false version of facts to the jury as wor-
thy of belief, and may not recite or rely upon the false testimony in his or her
closing argument.
230. See infra appendix at §§ II(3)(a), II(3)(b).
231. MODEL CODE, supra note 114, at DR 7-101(B)(1), EC 7-5, 7-6, 7-8.
232. DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 99, at § 4-5.2.
233. See United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969) (right to testify does not include
right to commit perjury); Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (waiver of privilege
against self-incrimination; defendant subject to punishment for contempt for refusing to
answer relevant questions), reh'g denied, 356 U.S. 948 (1958); United States v. Dingle,
546 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1976) (counsel's tactical decision not to call defendant as wit-
ness, contrary to defendant's wishes, does not constitute ineffective assistance.
234. See infra appendix at § II(3)(c)(v).
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failed to make appropriate motions and objections. Failure to
move for suppression of a confession 235 or the fruits of an illegal
search,2 36 for example, has been found to constitute ineffective
assistance. Failure to proffer motions concerning other issues has
similarly been regarded as ineffective assistance.237 Courts have
treated the failure to raise objections in the same way.238 However,
such failures, standing alone, do not necessarily constitute ineffec-
tive assistance. They must be considered in context with the facts
of the case and counsel's trial strategy.
Motions and objections are matters that rest solely within coun-
sel's discretion. They may be made only after consideration of tac-
tical and legal issues. 239 Consequently, the decision to forego
making motions and objections might be based on reasonable trial
tactics.2 ° When this is the case, courts are hesitant to "second
guess" the decision.241 Therefore, counsel's duty to raise appropri-
ate motions and objections is not absolute. He fulfills it by making
decisions, based upon strategic concerns, that will further a sound
defense.
f. Effective Argument
Subsection II(3)(c)(vi) defines counsel's duty in regard to open-
ing and closing statements.242 It does not make such statements
235. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794 (1 1th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1098 (1983); United States v. Friel, 588 F. Supp. 1173 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Lufkins v.
Solem, 554 F. Supp. 988 (D.S.D.), affid, 716 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 2667 (1984).
236. See, e.g., Moran v. Morris, 478 F. Supp. 145 (C.D. Cal. 1979), vacated, 665 F.2d
900 (9th Cir. 1981); People v. Sanin, 84 A.D.2d 681, 446 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1981).
237. See, e.g., Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1979) (failure to move for
mistrial); Ganger v. Peyton, 258 F. Supp. 387, 391 (E.D. Va. 1966) (failure to make
motions of record to insure reviewability of issues).
238. See, e.g., Ricalday v. Procunier, 736 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984) (failure to object to
clearly improper jury instructions); Alston v. Garrison, 720 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1983)
(failure to object to prosecutor's comment concerning defendant's silence at time of
arrest), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3589 (1984); Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967)
(failure to object to defendant appearing at trial in jail uniform).
239. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965); Hester v. United States, 303 F.2d 47
(10th Cir. 1962).
240. See, e.g., United States v. Hager, 505 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1974) (counsel wanted
to avoid possible impeachment of defendant by prior convictions); Williams v. Beto, 354
F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965) (counsel did not want to risk alienating jury).
241. See United States v. Payne, 741 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1984); United States ex rel.
Cornitcher v. Rundle, 285 F. Supp. 625, 628 (E.D. Pa. 1968) ("Counsel are not held to
Delphic anticipation of all future decisions that might retroactively affect the case."),
aff'd, 406 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1969).
242. See infra appendix at § II(3)(c)(vi).
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mandatory,24 3 since counsel may have tactical reasons for not mak-
ing them.2" Counsel's duty, if he decides to make the statements,
is to present the relevant facts and legal concepts in an accurate, 245
ethical 246 and persuasive manner.
g. Preservation of the Record
The final trial duty addressed in the Guidelines relates to the
need to protect a client's rights on appeal.247 Counsel, of course,
must do this throughout the course of the trial. However, the fo-
cus of this subsection is on counsel's duty to preserve, by appropri-
ate procedural devices, all appealable issues. Such devices include,
but are not limited to, proper objections, 24 8 motions to strike,249
243. Failure to make an opening statement or closing argument has generally been
held not to constitute ineffective assistance. See Bellavia v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 369 (2d Cir.
1979) (waiver of opening statement); People v. Espinoza, 99 Cal. App. 3d 44, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 803 (1979) (waiver of closing argument). But see United States v. Lespier, 558 F.2d
624 (1st Cir. 1977) (waiver of opening statement one factor in finding of ineffective assist-
ance); Mullins v. Evans, 473 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Colo 1979) (waiver of closing argument
one factor in finding of ineffective assistance), affd, 622 F.2d 504 (10th Cir. 1980). The
Defense Function Standards relating to the subject are silent on the issue of whether open-
ing and closing statements are mandatory. See DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra
note 99, at §§ 4-7.4, 4-7.8.
244. See Murray v. Maggio, 736 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1984) (opening statement); People
v. Huffman, 71 Cal. App. 3d 63, 139 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1977) (waiver of closing argument).
245. See Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.) (ineffective closing argument),
reh'g denied, 603 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1979); Oesby v. United States, 398 A.2d 1, 5 (D.C.
App. 1979) ("confusing and unilluminating" opening statement constituted ineffective
assistance).
246. See United States ex rel. Castelberry v. Sielaff, 446 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ill.) (in
opening statement, defense counsel accused prosecutor of racism; this, combined with
other counsel behavior, constituted ineffective assistance), reh'g denied, 446 F. Supp. 455
(1978); People v. Robinson, 70 Ill. App. 3d 24, 387 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (1979) (defense
counsel's crude and offensive tone and use of profanity in summation constituted ineffec-
tive assistance); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 114, at DR 7-106(C):
In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:
(1) State or allude to any matter that he has no reasonable basis to believe is
relevant to the case or that will not be supported by admissible evidence.
(3) Assert his personal knowledge of the facts in issue ....
(4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause ....
(6) Engage in undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to a
tribunal.
247. See infra appendix at § II(3)(c)(vii).
248. See United States v. McCoy, 193 U.S. 593 (1904) (failure to make proper objec-
tion waives review of the admissibility of the evidence); United States v. Bunker, 532 F.2d
1262, 1264 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976) (in absence of hearsay objection, the point is not preserved
on appeal; citing FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1) (rulings on evidence; effect of erroneous ruling;
objection)); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 51.
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offers of proof,25 0 motions for a mistrial,251 motion for judgment of
acquittal,25 2 objections to jury instructions, 253 motion for arrest of
judgment,254 and motion for a new trial.2 " If counsel fails to make
an objection or proffer a motion on the record, the issue that could
have been the subject of these actions might be waived and, there-
fore, be unappealable. 56 Such a failure may constitute ineffective
assistance.257
D. Subsection II(4):28 Duties Concerning Post-trial
Proceedings
Counsel's responsibilities to his client usually do not end with
the rendering of a verdict of guilty. Though some would disagree
with this statement,259 it is suggested that counsel has an affirma-
tive duty to protect a client's rights during the period between the
249. See United States v. Hutcher, 622 F.2d 1083, 1087 (2d Cir.) (discusses need for
motion to strike; citing FED. R. EvID. 103(a)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875 (1980).
250. See Espino v. Kingsville, 676 F.2d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 1982) (dismissed allega-
tions of error because offer of proof was not made; citing FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2)).
251. See generally Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982); Arizona v. Washington,
434 U.S. 497 (1978); Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961). See Nero v. Blackburn,
597 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.) (counsel's failure to move for mistrial constituted ineffective
assistance), reh'g denied, 603 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1979).
252. See Palos v. United States, 416 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1969) (failure to make motion
waives review), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 980 (1970); FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.
253. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 30 ("No party may assign as error any portion of the
charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider
its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objec-
tion."). See generally Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Ricalday v. Procunier, 736
F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984) (failure to object to clearly improper jury instruction constitutes
ineffective assistance).
254. See Rowiette v.. United States, 392 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1968) (waiver); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 34.
255. See Goforth v. Dutton, 409 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1969) (counsel's failure to pursue
motion for new trial constituted ineffective assistance); FED. R. CRIM. P. 33.
256. See supra notes 234-41.
257. See Perron v. Perrin, 742 F.2d 669 (1st Cir. 1984) (counsel has duty to preserve
record for appeal); Arrowood v. Clusen, 732 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1984) (failure to request
jury instruction); Pinnell v. Cauthron, 540 F.2d 938 (8th Cir. 1976) (failure to object to
admissibility of defendant's pretrial statements); United States ex rel. Maselli v. Reincke,
383 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1967) (failure to move to set aside guilty verdict in order to perfect
appeal); Ganger v. Peyton, 258 F. Supp. 387 (E.D. Va. 1966) (failure to make motions on
record to insure review on appeal); Commonwealth v. Cook, 380 Mass. 314, 403 N.E.2d
363 (1980) (failure to request jury instruction concerning accomplice's testimony); Com-
monwealth v. Humphrey, 473 Pa. 533, 375 A.2d 717 (1977) (failure to move to strike
objectionable testimony). But see Bell v. Lockhart, 741 F.2d 1105, 1107 (8th Cir. 1984)
(failure to move for directed verdict, based on tactical reasoning, did not constitute inef-
fective assistance).
258. See infra appendix at § 11(4).
259. See, e.g., Buxton v. Brown, 222 Ga. 564, 150 S.E.2d 636 (1966).
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rendition of the verdict and sentencing.260 Subsection II(4) ad-
dresses this duty.261
The protective measures contemplated by this provision include
the duty to preserve the client's right of appeal.262 Other, less well-
defined duties are also present. Counsel must advise the client re-
garding the meaning of the verdict, the procedural steps that must
be taken prior to sentencing, and the sentencing process. Counsel's
duty is to inform his client of his status at that stage of the process
and to maintain the status quo until the time of sentencing.
Sentencing is considered a critical stage of the prosecution.263
The right to assistance of counsel at this stage is vital.26 Counsel
must actively participate in order to protect the client's rights in a
proceeding that will have a direct impact on his future.265 Subsec-
tion II(4)(b) addressed counsel's duties in this process.266
260. Counsel's responsibilities at this stage may be limited by the terms of his retainer
or court appointment. It is suggested, however, that counsel may have a professional-
versus contractual-responsibility to protect his client's rights at this juncture of the pro-
ceedings. See DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 99, at § 4-7.10 ("The trial
lawyer's responsibility includes presenting appropriate motions, after verdict and before
sentence, to protect the defendant's rights.") ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 18-6.3(a)
(2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as SENTENCING STANDARDS] ("The duties of... defense
attorneys do not cease upon conviction .....
261. See infra appendix at § 11(4).
262. See supra notes 247-57 and accompanying text.
263. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
264. Id.
265. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2064 (counsel's role at a capital sentencing proceeding
is comparable to counsel's role at trial); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 178 (1946) (the
need for counsel at sentencing may be greater than that at trial); SENTENCING STAN-
DARDS, supra note 260, at § 18-6.3(e) ("The defense attorney should recognize that the
sentencing stage is the time at which for many defendants the most important service of
the entire proceeding can be performed.").
266. See infra appendix at § II(4)(b). This section was drafted to mirror the language
and substance of the applicable provisions in the Defense Function Standards. See DE-
FENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 99, at § 4-8.1:
(a) The lawyer for the accused should be familiar with the sentencing alterna-
tives available to the court and should endeavor to learn its practices in exercis-
ing sentencing discretion. The consequences of the various dispositions
available should be explained fully by the lawyer to the accused.
(b) Defense counsel should present to the court any ground which will assist
in reaching a proper disposition favorable to the accused. If a presentence re-
port or summary is made available to the defense lawyer, he should seek to
verify the information contained in it and should be prepared to supplement or
challenge it if necessary. If there is no presentence report or if it is not dis-
closed, the lawyer should submit to the court and the prosecutor all favorable
information relevant to sentencing and in an appropriate case be prepared to
suggest a program of rehabilitation based on the lawyer's exploration of em-
ployment, educational, and other opportunities made available by community
services.
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This section emphasizes counsel's dual roles. First, he is a
source of information for both the client and the court. More sig-
nificantly, he is his client's advocate. The provision focuses on the
fact that only counsel can protect his client from the consequences
of an uninformed or unsympathetic court.267
The standards for effective assistance during the sentencing pro-
cess have never received the attention accorded to the trial and
appellate stages. Various formulations have been suggested, 26' but
few have been formally adopted by courts. 2 6 9 However, courts
have adjudicated postconviction claims based on allegations of in-
effective assistance at sentencing. Most of the claims arise from
situations where a defendant was represented by substitute coun-
sel270 or where counsel failed to actively and effectively represent
his client's interests. 71 Other inadequacies have also been deemed
ineffective assistance.27 2 Thus both the defendant and counsel have
significant reasons for insuring the adequacy of representation at
sentencing.
After sentencing, the defendant's only avenue for relief from the
conviction or sentence lies in a postconviction or appellate action.
Sentencing may bring to an end trial counsel's representation.
(c) Counsel should alert the accused to the right of allocution, if any, and to
the possible dangers of making a judicial confession in the course of allocution
which might tend to prejudice an appeal.
267. See A. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING §§ 102-23 (1978) (defense counsel's
role); Feit, "Before Sentence is Pronounced...." A Guide to Defense Counsel in the
Exercise of His Post-Conviction Responsibilities, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 140 (1973); Portman,
Defense Lawyer's New Role in the Sentencing Process, 34 FED. PROBATION 3 (1979).
268. See, e.g., DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 99, at §§ 4-8.1, 4-8.2;
SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 260, at § 18-6.3; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMIS-
SION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE GOALS AND STANDARDS REPORT ON CORRECTIONS § 5.18
(1973).
269. See United States v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (referring to vari-
ous sentencing standards, including those found in the Defense Function Standards).
270. See, e.g., United States v. Lucas, 513 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1975); People v. Ward,
47 A.D.2d 891, 367 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1975).
271. For cases dealing with failure to present evidence concerning mitigation, see
United States v. Daniels, 558 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1977); Gadsen v. United States, 223 F.2d
627 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Dix v. Newsome, 584 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Ga. 1984). See also
People v. Cropper, 89 Cal. App. 3d 716, 152 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1979) (total failure to pre-
sent evidence and argument).
272. See, e.g., United States v. Donn, 661 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981) (failure to show
defendant the presentence report prior to sentencing); Canary v. Bland, 583 F.2d 887 (6th
Cir. 1978) (counsel failed to protest defendant's sentence as habitual criminal which was
based on a prior juvenile court adjudication); Thomas v. Lockhart, 378 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1984) (counsel failed to investigate defendant's mental condition relative to sentencing
alternatives); Johnson v. Kemp, 585 F. Supp. 1496 (S.D. Ga. 1984) (failure to present
evidence or witnesses; defendant sentenced to death), vacated, 759 F.2d 1503 (1 1th Cir.
1985).
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However, regardless of whether counsel withdraws at this point or
goes on to represent his client in future proceedings, he has certain
responsibilities to his client during the interval between sentencing
and filing for review.
Counsel's duties are both informational and prophylactic.273
First, counsel has a duty to explain to the defendant the meaning
and consequences of the conviction and sentence, the substance of
available postconviction remedies and his evaluation of their poten-
tial for success. If counsel fails to fulfill this duty, by inaction 274 or
by rendering incorrect advice,275 the defendant may have grounds
for a claim of ineffective assistance.
Counsel's other duty is to take all steps necessary to preserve his
client's right to appeal. This may take a number of forms. It may
be as simple as informing the client of the statutory time limita-
tions for filing an action or providing the client with the proper
forms for requesting appointment of counsel, or filing a habeas
corpus petition. The danger, of course, is that without counsel's
assistance the defendant may, due to ignorance of the law or inac-
tion, effectively waive his rights to postconviction remedies. A
waiver resulting from counsel's breach of duty may constitute inef-
fective assistance.276
273. DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 99, at § 4-8.2 provide:
(a) After conviction, the lawyer should explain to the defendant the meaning
and consequences of the court's judgment and the defendant's right of appeal.
The lawyer should give the defendant his or her professional judgment as to
whether there are meritorious grounds for appeal and as to the probable result
of an appeal. The lawyer should also explain to the defendant the advantages
and disadvantages of an appeal. The decision whether to appeal must be the
defendant's own choice.
(b) The lawyer should take whatever steps are necessary to protect the defend-
ant's right of appeal.
274. See, e.g., Martin v. Texas, 737 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1984) (failure to advise indi-
gent defendant of right to have appellate counsel appointed); Wayne v. Wyrick, 646 F.2d
1268 (8th Cir. 1981) (failure to perfect an appeal on instructions from defendant);
Thomas v. Zimmerman, 583 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (failure to file notice of appeal
on defendant's request); Smothermann v. Beto, 276 F. Supp. 579, 585 (N.D. Tex. 1967)
(discusses specific duties of counsel at post-trial stage). Contra Callahan v. Virginia, 262
F. Supp. 31 (W.D. Va. 1967) (assistance not inadequate, despite counsel's failure to in-
form defendant of right to appeal, when defendant was satisfied with outcome).
275. See Powers v. United States, 446 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1971); Stewart v. Wain-
wright, 309 F. Supp. 1023 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
276. Wilson v. United States, 554 F.2d 893 (8th Cir.) (failure to advise defendant of
right to petition for writ of certiorari), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 849 (1977); Wynn v. Page,
369 F.2d 930 (10th Cir. 1966) (failure to inform defendant of right to appeal); Ingram v.
Peyton, 367 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1966) (failure to inform defendant of potentially meritori-
ous grounds for appeal that were known to counsel at the time).
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HLI. Procedural Guidelines
The protection afforded in the substantive Guidelines is mean-
ingless without a procedure for insuring that it is not being denied.
It is suggested that the process of review will insure this protection
most efficiently. The procedural Guidelines277 attempt to imple-
ment the review of ineffective assistance claims in an efficient man-
ner consistent with the standards set out by the Court in
Strickland.27 s These Guidelines do not attempt to address all of the
procedural279 and constitutional2 0 rights that relate to the review
process in general. Since they are intended to be incorporated into
state and federal legislative schemes, any attempt in this article to
tailor them to individual codes would be impossible. This task is
left to the individual legislatures.2 1
277. See infra appendix at § III.
278. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-71. Most state constitutions contain right-to-
counsel provisions similar to the sixth amendment. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10
("In any trial, in any court, the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in
person and with counsel."). In interpreting and applying these provisions, some state
courts have afforded defendants more protection of their right to effective counsel than
that found in the sixth amendment as interpreted by federal courts. Flores v. Flores, 598
P.2d 893 (Alaska 1979) (state constitutional right to counsel in civil cases); State v. Lane,
60 Ohio St. 2d 112, 397 N.E.2d 1338 (1979). In such cases, defendants may be better
served by alleging violations of their rights to effective counsel under both the state and
United States constitutions. In some cases they may obtain relief under the state consti-
tutional provision, and not the sixth amendment, because the burden of proof imposed by
the state may be less than that imposed by Strickland. This should be taken into consid-
eration by state legislatures drafting or adopting legislation in this area. See Blue v. State,
558 P.2d 636, 641 (Alaska 1977) (right to counsel under state constitution accorded
broader protection than under sixth amendment).
279. For example, a detailed discussion of procedures such as stays of execution, the
record on appeal, release pending appeal, or the transmission of the record are beyond the
scope of this article. Development of appropriate procedures, in this regard, would be
left to the enacting jurisdiction.
280. For example, a defendant convicted in a state court does not have a constitu-
tional right to appellate review of the conviction. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). However, if a state creates a statutory or com-
mon-law right to review, defendants must be accorded certain due process and equal
protection guarantees. See, e.g., Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (right of indigent
to free transcript of record); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel);
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (waiver of filing fee if indigent). These guarantees are
also applicable to state postconviction proceedings. Long v. Iowa, 385 U.S. 192, 194
(1966); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709
(1961). Therefore, it is assumed that these rights would be accorded defendants in the
proceedings described in the procedural Guidelines. See infra appendix at § III(l)(d).
281. Every jurisdiction provides some form of postconviction relief to defendants,
based on either statutory or common law. See D. WILKES, supra note 84, at §§ 1.1-1.8.
Consequently, any jurisdiction adopting these Guidelines would have to harmonize them
with existing forms of relief. Standards must also be consistent with federal constitu-
tional principles and the dictates of the Supreme Court. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U.S. 725, 746 (1981) ("It is basic to [the supremacy clause of the United States Constitu-
1986] Effective Assistance of Counsel
The procedural Guidelines are comprised of four distinct sec-
tions. Each describes a single step in the process of review. The
first section defines the jurisdictional scope of review and the rem-
edy.282 Exclusive jurisdiction is given to the court in which the
alleged ineffective assistance occurred. 283  The rationale for this
two-fold. First, this court is most familiar with the facts contained
in the allegation. Second, as a matter of judicial economy, since a
large number of such claims initially filed in appellate courts are
ultimately remanded for further evidentiary hearings, it seems de-
sirable to confine the initiation of these actions to the court to
which they may be remanded. 284 An additional benefit may be a
reduction in frivolous claims.285
This section defines three additional jurisdictional limitations.
tion] that all conflicting state provisions be without effect."); United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1 (1936) (state legislation must conform to United States Constitution and its princi-
ples).
These Guidelines reflect much of the language and underlying policy of the 1980 Uni-
form Post-Conviction Procedure Act and its predecessors [hereinafter cited as the UNI-
FORM ACT]. Though only a minority of states have adopted it, the act should be used as
a guide in implementing and interpreting the Guidelines. The act's recommended post-
conviction action has been used, with some success, as a forum for litigating ineffective-
ness claims. See State v. Blackburn, 99 Idaho 222, 579 P.2d 1205 (1978); Emery v. Fen-
ton, 266 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1978) (Iowa postconviction statute intended as a substitute for
habeas corpus); State v. McBride, 296 N.W.2d 551 (S.D. 1980) (postconviction action is
the proper vehicle for ineffectiveness claims); see also Note, The Need for an Iowa Post-
Conviction Hearing Statute, 18 DRAKE L. REV. 98 (1968); Note, The Uniform Post-Con-
viction Procedure Act, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1956).
282. See infra appendix at § III(1).
283. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 281, at § 2 (vesting jurisdiction in court of origi-
nal jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases). This preference is also reflected by the drafters of
the ABA Standards. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES, § 22-1.4 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
POST CONVICTION STANDARDS] ("An action for postconviction relief should be brought
in the court in which the applicant's challenged conviction and sentence was [sic] ren-
dered.") Id. at § 22-1.4(b). This preference has been criticized by some members of the
criminal defense bar. See ABA SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, EFFECTIVE
STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES-THEIR NATURE AND ESSENTIALITIES 26 (1958).
284. See Allen v. State, 217 N.W.2d 528 (Iowa 1974) (purpose of postconviction rem-
edy is to return to trial courts, for first consideration and possible correction, challenges
addressed to their prior actions).
285. A number of courts have suggested that, too often, petitions raise frivolous
claims. See, e.g., Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669-700 (D.C. Cir.) ("drafting of peti-
tions for habeas corpus has become a game in many penal institutions"; a petitioner has
nothing to lose), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945); United States v. Edwards, 152 F.
Supp. 179 (D.D.C.) (many petitions are filed simply because the defendant is disap-
pointed in the results at trial), afl'd, 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847
(1958). It is suggested that due to the exclusive nature of this remedy (§ III(l)(b) of the
Guidelines), the limitations as to its reviewability and the prohibition against successive
petitions (§ III(3)(e)), petitioners might be less likely to play the "game." The trial judge
is best equipped to dispose of such cases before they move through the appellate levels.
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First, the proceeding is limited to allegations of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. Claims founded on other grounds must be con-
sidered in a different proceeding.1 6 Second, this proceeding is a
claimant's exclusive remedy; it replaces other statutory and com-
mon-law remedies presently available.2"7 Yet a claimant will still
retain the right to apply for judicial review of the judgment.8 8 Fi-
nally, the action must be initiated within one year of the final judg-
ment. This limitation is intended to deter defendants from filing an
action, years after the alleged incident, when it might be difficult to
ascertain the true facts.
An action alleging ineffective assistance may be initiated only by
a petition for postconviction relief.289 It must be filed in the court
having exclusive jurisdiction over such actions. The petition must
clearly state: (1) facts identifying the judgment that is the focus of
the claim; (2) facts on which the allegation is based; (3) facts
describing how the petitioner was prejudiced; and (4) the relief de-
sired. If the petitioner has access to affidavits, records or other
evidence supporting the petition, copies must be attached to the
petition. When the jurisdictional and pleading requirements have
been met, the process of review will begin.
Subsection (2) defines the standard for summary disposition.29 °
Its substance is based on the two-pronged test described in Strick-
land.29' If, after an evaluation of the record, or at the conclusion
of an evidentiary hearing, it is clear that the assistance was ineffec-
tive according to the Strickland requirements, the court may sum-
marily grant appropriate relief. If the court determines that the
claim may be described as falling into one of the three specified
categories, it may summarily dismiss the petition. However, if
there exists a material issue of fact concerning the allegation, the
court is precluded from granting summary relief and must grant an
286. The postconviction procedures presently in place would be utilized for the adju-
dication of claims founded on other grounds.
287. This was the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Act and the states that
adopted it. See Coleman v. State, 633 P.2d 624, 628 (Mont. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
983 (1982); State v. Jefferson Park Books, Inc., 314 N.W.2d 73, 76 (N.D. 1981); Finklea
v. State, 273 S.C. 157, 255 S.E.2d 447 (1979).
288. See infra appendix at § III(3)(e).
289. This provision reflects the language and intent of the Uniform Act. See UNI-
FORM ACT, supra note 281, at §§ 3, 4; see also POSTCONVICTION STANDARDS, supra note
283, at Part B.
290. This provision is an integration of Uniform Act sections. See UNIFORM ACT,
supra note 281, at §§ 6(a), 9; see also POSTCONVICTION STANDARDS, supra note 283, at
§§ 22-4.4(d), 22-4.5(b).
291. See Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 1064; supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 17
1986] Effective Assistance of Counsel
evidentiary hearing.2 92
The substantive and procedural scope of a hearing is defined in
subsection (3).293 The scope of the hearing shall be limited to the
material facts at issue.294 Rules of procedure applicable to civil
proceedings will apply. The reception of evidence will be governed
by the codified rules of evidence. These requirements accord the
petitioner advantages that, historically, have not been available to
moving parties in postconviction actions.295
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court must render a deci-
sion based on explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law. It
may enter an order dismissing the petition or granting appropriate
relief.296 The order shall also inform the parties that the judgment
is reviewable by the appropriate court. Further, it shall state the
time limitations for giving notice of appeal.
The final portion of this subsection defines the limits of the re-
view process. 297 The decision of the court is reviewable, but a suc-
cessive petition based on the same facts will be summarily
dismissed. 298 These provisions, justified by the need for finality and
292. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 281, at § 9(a) (no summary disposition if "mat-
ters of record" show that there is a "genuine issue of fact"); accord POSTCONVICTION
STANDARDS, supra note 283, at § 22-4.5(b).
293. See infra appendix at § 111(3).
294. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 281, at § 7; POSTCONVICTION STANDARDS,
supra note 283, at § 22.4.6.
295. For example, petitioners in federal postconviction actions (28 U.S.C. §§ 2254-
55) have, at best, only partial access to the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID.
1101(d)(3); 5 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 622 (1981).
296. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 281, at § 11; POSTCONVICTION STANDARDS,
supra note 283, at §§ 22-4.6(e), 22-4.7.
297. See infra appendix at § III(3)(e).
298. It is unquestioned that defendants have a constitutional right of access to courts
to litigate alleged violations of federal constitutional rights. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817 (1977) (access must be adequate, effective and meaningful); Johnson v. Avery, 393
U.S. 483 (1969) (access through federal habeas corpus). Although the Constitution may
not require states to establish procedures for postconviction or appellate review, once
such procedures are established, states may not create unreasonable impediments to their
implementation. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611-12 (1974); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384
U.S. 305, 310 (1966). However, the limitations placed on state court review do not ap-
pear unreasonable. Such limitations have existed in federal law for some time. See, e.g.,
RULES GOVERNING [28 U.S.C.] SECTION 2254 CASES AND SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1978), § 2254, Rule 9(b), and § 2255, Rule
9(b) (1978). These Rules have survived constitutional challenges. See Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir.
1980). Therefore, since a defendant is granted the right to state appellate court review
upon the dismissal of his first petition, the constitutionality of this section does not appear
to be in question. A dissatisfied petitioner may still seek review in the federal appellate
system.
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judicial economy,299 will not handicap petitioners with legitimate
claims. It is hoped that their effect will be to drastically reduce the
filing of successive, frivolous petitions.
The final subsection, the heart of the procedural Guidelines, de-
fines the burden of proof. Its formulation is based on the holding
in Strickland.3°
The petitioner must clear three hurdles to prove his allegation.
The first is the rebuttable presumption "that counsel's conduct
[fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. ° I
The petitioner must overcome the presumption that the alleged in-
effective assistance was "sound trial strategy" 302-the most widely
accepted defense to, and justification for, alleged misconduct of
counsel.30 3 Though the Court never explained how it intended this
"presumption" to be defined or applied to specific facts, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the intended meaning is that applica-
ble in the jurisdiction hearing the case.3" As used in the Guide-
lines, this evidentiary rule means that the petitioner is confronted,
at the outset, with the rebuttable presumption that counsel's assist-
ance was effective.3 °5 As the movant, he has the burden of produc-
ing evidence to overcome the presumption.30 6 However, since he
299. As one judge accurately perceived, "[i]t is evident that the orderly administra-
tion of justice requires that a criminal controversy, like any other litigation, [must] some
day come to an end." Commonwealth v. Slavik, 449 Pa. 424, 432, 297 A.2d 920, 924
(1972).
300. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
301. See Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2065-66 ("[A] court must indulge a strong pre-
sumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance .... ).
302. Id. at 2066.
303. To constitute ineffective assistance, a tactical decision must be so ill-chosen as to
render the proceeding fundamentally unfair. See Solomon v. Kemp, 735 F.2d 395, 402
(11th Cir. 1984) (citing Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2067), reh'g denied, 105 S. Ct. 1236
(1985).
304. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 349 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984); FED. R. EVID.
302.
305. In applying for relief, a defendant must plead certain basic facts. For example,
he must allege: (1) that his representative at trial was an attorney; and (2) that the attor-
ney functioned as his legal counsel. Once these basic facts are established, the Strickland
presumption of effective assistance attaches. Therefore, the defendant's allegations in the
application may be construed as judicial admissions that conclusively establish the basic
facts underlying the rebuttable presumption of effectiveness. See C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 304, at §§ 265, 346-49; 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1064-67 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed.
1972). A number of states have specifically incorporated this rule into their codified rules
of evidence. See, e.g., OKLA. R. EVID. 302 (1978) ("The basic fact of a presumption may
be established in an action by the pleadings . ); B. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA Evi-
DENCE BENCHBOOK 804 (1972).
306. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 304, at §§ 336-41. The petitioner in a postcon-
viction action bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness of the trial
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has the burdens of production and persuasion with respect to the
entire hearing, the effect of the presumption of competence may be
of little consequence.30 The final word as to the proper applica-
tion of this presumption must await further clarification by the
Supreme Court.
The second hurdle that must be surmounted is proof of an un-
reasonable deviation from the "performance" element of the
Strickland test. This is satisfied by proving that counsel failed to
perform one or more of the duties described in the substantive
Guidelines.3 °s However, petitioner must also prove that the "fail-
ure" was not in fact the result of a reasonable tactical decision. 30 9
Finally, assuming that a violation of the performance standard is
established, petitioner must prove a causal relationship between the
violation and his alleged injury. More specifically, he must prove
that there is a reasonable probability that counsel's deficient per-
formance adversely affected the outcome of the case,310 that is, that
the outcome would have been different but for counsel's ineffective
assistance. 31  Furthermore, the petitioner must overcome the pre-
sumption that he was not prejudiced by counsel's performance.31 2
In effect, the petitioner must prove that but for counsel's ineffective
assistance he would not have been convicted.31 3
If the petitioner sustains his burden of proof as to both elements
of the test, relief must be granted. 3 4 The court will grant whatever
proceedings, as well as the burden of proving the material facts supporting his allegations.
See Patton v. Yount, 104 S. Ct. 2885 (1984) (28 U.S.C. § 2254 action; presumption of
correctness); Parker v. Parratt, 662 F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1981) (28 U.S.C. § 2254 action;
petitioner bears burden of proof as to material issues), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 846 (1982);
Thomas v. State, 316 N.W.2d 182 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981) (state postconviction action).
307. The presumption adds nothing to the petitioner's burden of proof as it relates to
material issues of fact. This is true because the petitioner already has the burden of
production as to the basic facts that, when proven, will bring into being the presumed
fact. See supra note 305.
308. See Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. "First, the defendant must show that coun-
sel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so seri-
ous that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment." Id. Though the Court specifically refused to recognize or articulate
a list of "errors" that would fulfill the burden of proof in this regard, the procedural
Guidelines require proof of failure to perform "one or more duties set out in the substan-
tive guidelines." See infra appendix at § III(4)(c)(i).
309. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.
310. Id. at 2068.
311. Id.
312. See id.; supra note 71 and accompanying text.
313. 104 S. Ct. at 2068.
314. The defendant must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
This is a common standard of proof in postconviction actions. See, e.g., Powers v. United
States, 446 F.2d 22, 24 (5th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Senk v. Brierley, 363 F.
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relief is appropriate for the injury sustained.315
CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that the most important constitutional
right of an accused is the right to assistance of counsel.316 Unless
the assistance is effective, this right is of little value. This article
attempted to give substance to this right and to provide a proce-
dural device by which its denial can be remedied.
Fulfillment of this goal has been hindered in the past by the lack
of any uniform guidelines for the adjudication of ineffectiveness
claims. Claimants have been forced to build their own cases on the
uncertain and unpredictable foundation of common-law con-
cepts. 317  The problem, of course, is not new;31 8 neither are the
proposed solutions. 31 9 Nor is the problem limited to ineffectiveness
claims.32° Yet, flawed as it may be, the best vehicle for the realiza-
tion of the goal is legislation.
Codification of standards cannot guarantee absolute certainty, 32I
Supp. 51 (M.D. Pa. 193); Heck v. State, 103 Idaho 648, 651 P.2d 582 (1982); Kelly v.
Nix, 329 N.W.2d 287, 291-92 (Iowa 1983); In re Jones, 176 Mont. 412, 578 P.2d 1150
(1978); accord POSTCONVICTION STANDARDS, supra note 283, at § 22-4.6(d).
315. The court should have the authority to fashion appropriate remedies.
316. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1956).
317. For discussions of jurisprudential uncertainty, see J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 335 (Lafleur ed. 1948) ("un-
certainty is of the very essence of [common law]"); D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1983); Farago, Intractable Cases: The Role of Uncertainty in the Con-
cept of Law, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 195 (1980); Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law,
81 YALE L.J. 823 (1972).
318. See, e.g., 5 J. BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 235 (1843):
Do you know how they make [the common law]? Just as man makes law for
his dog. When your dog does anything you want to break him of, you wait until
he does it and then beat him. This is the way you make law for your dog, and
this is the way judges make laws for you and me. They won't tell a man before-
hand ....
319. See generally J. BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 156-83 (H. Hart ed. 1970)
(codification); D'Amato, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges?, I GA. L. REV. 1277
(1977); Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (reduction theory); Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53
TEX. L. REV. 757 (1975) (efficiency as justice).
320. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Cooper, A Voluntary
Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 COLUM L. REV. 161,
163 (1977).
321. See, e.g., Gilmore, Commercial Law in the United States: Its Codification and
Other Misadventures, in ASPECTS OF COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL LAW: SALES, CON-
SUMER CREDIT, AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS 449 (J. Ziegel & W. Foster eds. 1969);
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nor can it insure protection of the rights of defendants.3 22 Law is
simply a tool to be used to give substance to these ideals.3 23  The
ultimate solution to the problem of ineffective assistance lies in the
hands of defense attorneys. It is their zeal and commitment which
gives meaning to the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance
of counsel.
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809
(1935); Freund, Prolegomena to a Science of Legislation, 13 Nw. U.L. REV. 264 (1918).
322. At best, the law can mandate an "official behavioral reaction" by defense coun-
sel. See D'Amato, supra note 316, at 36-41. Though a statute may command appropriate
behavior, it cannot insure compliance. See Radin, Solving Problems by Statute, 14 OR. L.
REV. 90 (1934).
323. See generally Freund, supra note 320.
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Appendix
MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
I. Preamble
It is the intent of the legislature that the following Model Guide-
lines be interpreted and applied to achieve the following goals:
(1) to guarantee that all criminal defendants shall receive effec-
tive assistance of counsel at all stages of the adjudicatory
process as mandated by the sixth amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States;
(2) to articulate concisely the nature and extent of counsel's
duty to his client in all stages of the adjudicatory process;
and
(3) to assist courts in the evaluation of claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel and to insure that such evaluations are
accomplished in a uniform manner based upon uniform
criteria.
II. Substantive Guidelines
(1) Establishment of the Attorney-Client Relationship
(a) Once retained or appointed, counsel shall, as soon as is
practicable, contact his client, ascertain all relevant
facts known to the client, and explain to the client the
necessity of full disclosure of all facts relevant to the
case.
(b) After determining the relevant facts, counsel shall take
affirmative steps to determine whether he, his partners
or his associates have interests that could in any way
conflict with those of the client. If such a conflict of
interest exists, counsel shall: (i) immediately disclose
this matter to his client, and (ii) take whatever steps
are necessary to withdraw from the case and assist his
client in retaining other counsel. These duties shall
continue throughout the period of counsel's represen-
tation of his client.
(c) As soon as practicable, counsel shall inform his client
of his legal rights and take whatever steps are available
promptly to protect them. Further, counsel shall con-
sider, and discuss with his client, all procedural steps
which, in good faith, may be taken to protect these
rights. These steps shall include, for example, moving
for the client's pretrial release, obtaining psychiatric
examination of the client when necessary, moving for a
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change of venue or continuance, moving to suppress
illegally obtained evidence, moving for severance from
jointly charged defendants, and seeking dismissal of
the charges.
(d) After determining the relevant facts and law, counsel
shall, with complete candor, advise his client concern-
ing all aspects of the case, including counsel's best pro-
fessional judgment as to the probable outcomes of
various courses of action available. Further, counsel
shall keep his client informed of developments in the
case and progress of defense preparation so that his
client is able to make informed decisions concerning
his defense.
(2) Pretrial Investigation and Preparation
(a) Counsel shall promptly and thoroughly investigate all
factual and legal issues relevant to the issues of de-
fense, guilt and degree of guilt and penalty. The inves-
tigation must include efforts to secure information in
the possession of the prosecution, law enforcement au-
thorities and independent witnesses. The duty to in-
vestigate exists regardless of the client's admissions or
statements to the lawyer regarding guilt or the client's
stated desire to plead guilty.
(b) Whenever appropriate after a full investigation of the
case, counsel shall explore the possibility of diverting
the case from the criminal process through the use of
available community agencies. Whenever counsel con-
cludes, after a thorough investigation of the relevant
facts and law, that a conviction is probable, he shall
promptly advise his client of his conclusion and seek
his consent to engage in plea discussions with the pros-
ecutor, if this course of action appears to be in his cli-
ent's best interests. Counsel shall secure his client's
consent prior to engaging the plea discussions. Fur-
ther, counsel shall fully inform his client of the content
and outcome of such discussions and shall not con-
clude an agreement with the prosecutor without first
securing his client's knowing and voluntary consent.
(c) Prior to the entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
or the commencement of a trial, counsel shall submit
to the trial judge his sworn affidavit setting out, in spe-
cific detail, all steps taken in the investigation and
preparation of the case. However, counsel shall not be
required to submit information that could be used to
jeopardize his client's rights at trial or during sentenc-
ing, or that would violate the attorney-client privilege.
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After examination by the trial court judge, the affidavit
will be sealed. In no case shall the prosecutor have
access to the affidavit before the final disposition of the
case at the trial level. The affidavit shall not be in-
cluded in the official record until the conclusion of the
case.
(3) Conduct of Litigation
(a) Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case
are ultimately for the client and others are ultimately
for defense counsel. The decisions to be made by the
client, who is mentally competent to do so, after full
consultation with counsel, are: (i) what plea to enter;
(ii) whether to waive jury trial; and (iii) whether to tes-
tify in his own behalf. All other decisions concerning
the conduct of the litigation, including strategic and
tactical decisions, are to be made by counsel after full
consultation with his client.
(b) If counsel and his client disagree on strategic and tacti-
cal matters, counsel shall make a record of the circum-
stances giving rise to the disagreement, his advice
concerning it, the reasons underlying his advice and
the conclusion reached. The record shall be made in a
manner which protects the confidentiality of the attor-
ney-client relationship.
If in the opinion of counsel the disagreement under-
mines his ability to effectively represent his client, he
shall immediately inform his client and explain to him
his right to seek other counsel. Counsel shall make a
record of this discussion and his client's decision. If
the client decides to seek other counsel, counsel shall
promptly inform the court of his client's decision, as-
sist his client in retaining new counsel and withdraw
from the case. In fulfilling this duty, counsel shall take
whatever steps are necessary to protect his client's in-
terests until new counsel is retained or appointed and
shall do nothing to jeopardize the confidentiality of the
attorney-client relationship.
(c) Counsel's conduct at trial shall effectively protect the
best interests of his client. Such conduct shall include:
(i) appropriate courtroom decorum and respect;
(ii) introduction of relevant evidence and legitimate
defenses;
(iii) thorough examination of all witnesses and pro-
spective jurors;
(iv) presentation of his client's testimony when such
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presentation is in the client's best interests and is
ethically appropriate;
(v) presentation of appropriate motions and objec-
tions during trial;
(vi) presentation of appropriate facts and arguments
to the trier of fact in both opening and closing
statements; and
(vii) performance of all steps necessary to preserve
the record of all potentially appealable issues.
These duties are mandatory except where their fulfillment
would be contrary to reasonable strategic and tactical decisions
formulated by counsel.
(4) Duties Concerning Post-Trial Proceedings
(a) Counsel shall take appropriate action, after the verdict
and before sentencing, to protect his client's rights.
(b) Counsel shall be familiar with the sentencing alterna-
tives available to the court and shall investigate the
court's exercise of its sentencing discretion. The con-
sequences of the various dispositions available shall be
explained fully by counsel to his client.
Counsel shall present to the court any ground which
may lead to a disposition favorable to his client. If a
presentence report or summary is made available to
counsel, he shall verify the information contained in it
and shall be prepared to supplement or challenge it if
necessary. If there is no presentence report or if it is
not disclosed to counsel, he shall submit to the court
and the prosecutor all favorable information relevant
to sentencing and, where appropriate, shall be pre-
pared to suggest a program of rehabilitation based on
his exploration of employment, educational and other
opportunities made available by community services.
Counsel shall alert his client to his right of allocution,
if any, and to the possible dangers of making, in the
course of allocution, a judicial confession which might
prejudice his appeal.
(c) After conviction, counsel shall explain to his client the
meaning and consequences of the judgment and his
right of appeal. He shall also explain to his client the
advantages, disadvantages, and probable results of
such an appeal. Further, counsel shall take whatever
steps are necessary to protect his client's right of
appeal.
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III. Procedural Guidelines
(1) Procedure for Review
(a) A person convicted of and sentenced for a crime may,
by instituting a proceeding within one year from the
date of final judgment, apply for relief under this act
.on the ground that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel.
(b) A proceeding under this act shall be the exclusive rem-
edy for collaterally challenging the validity of the judg-
ment of conviction or sentencing on the grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel. A petitioner must ex-
haust his remedies under this act prior to applying for
direct review in an appellate court.
(c) Exclusive jurisdiction to conduct these proceedings is
vested in the court that rendered the judgment which
is the subject of petitioner's allegations.
(d) A proceeding under this act is commenced by filing a
petition with the clerk of the court of exclusive juris-
diction. No filing fee is required. On request, and
upon proper showing, counsel will be appointed for
persons unable to obtain counsel.
(e) The petition must contain: (i) information identifying
the judgment complained of and the court that ren-
dered it; (ii) facts which petitioner believes support a
finding that such assistance probably undermined the
legitimacy of the outcome; and (iv) a statement of the
relief requested. Petitioner shall attach to the petition
copies of all affidavits, records, and other evidence that
support his allegations. The court, for good cause,
may allow petitioner to amend his petition prior to the
filing of an answer by the state.
(f) Within thirty days after the filing of the petition, or
within any further time the court may allow, the state
shall respond by answer or motion. The state may
move to dismiss the petition on the ground that it is
evident from the petition that the petitioner is not enti-
tled to relief and that no purpose would be served by
any further proceeding.
(g) The court, for good cause, may grant leave to either
party to use the discovery procedures available in
criminal or civil proceedings. Discovery may be used
only to the extent and in the manner allowed by the
court.
(2) Summary Disposition
(a) If it is evident from the pleadings and other matters of
[Vol. 17
Effective Assistance of Counsel
record that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the
court shall enter an order dismissing the petition.
(b) If it is evident from the pleadings and other matters of
record: (i) that the petition is without merit; or
(ii) that counsel's failure to exercise reasonable skill
and care (as set out in the substantive guidelines of this
act) was harmless error, the court shall enter an order
dismissing the petition.
(c) The court shall make, and set out in its order, explicit
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(d) If, after considering the pleadings and other matters of
record, there exists a genuine issue as to any material
fact, the court shall grant an evidentiary hearing.
(3) Evidentiary Hearing
(a) The court shall conduct a hearing in open court and
the evidence shall be recorded and preserved in the
record of the proceedings.
(b) The court shall limit the scope of the hearing to a de-
termination of the material facts at issue.
(c) The hearing shall be conducted pursuant to rules of
procedure and evidence applicable to civil proceedings.
(d) At the conclusion of the hearing, the court shall make
explicit findings on material issues of fact and ex-
pressly state its conclusions of law relating to each is-
sue presented. The order shall inform the parties of
their right to appellate review of the judgment and the
time limitations for seeking relief.
(e) The court's judgment shall be reviewable only by the
[appropriate court]. The decision of the [appropriate
court] is nonreviewable. A second or successive peti-
tion based upon the same facts will be summarily
dismissed.
(4) Burden of Proof
(a) The petitioner shall have the burden of proving the
facts alleged by a preponderance of the evidence.
(b) There exists a rebuttable presumption as to the follow-
ing: (1) that counsel's assistance was effective; and
(2) if it is found that counsel's assistance was ineffec-
tive, that the defendant was not prejudiced thereby.
Failure to rebut this presumption shall be grounds for
dismissal of the petition.
(c) In order for relief to be granted, petitioner must prove:
(i) that counsel failed to perform the duties set out in
the substantive guidelines of this act; and (ii) that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's er-
rors, the result of the proceeding would have been dif-
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ferent. A "reasonable probability" is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of
that proceeding.
